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INTRODUCTION

After two years of bitter struggles,' a new Civil Rights Act was
passed.2 Proponents of civil rights legislation had been battling on
several fronts. One front concentrated on attacking unequal employment practices, while the other is still searching for a road to entrepreneurial equality. 3 Most of these activities centered on the Civil
1. See Marcia Coyle & Fred Strasser, The Sides Find Consensus in Civil Rights Bill,
NAT'L L.L, Nov. 11, 1991, at 5 ("After two years of bitter fighting among the white House,
Congress, civil rights groups and business, legislation overturning seven recent high court
rulings on job discrimination is about to become law. . . ."); see also Sabotage Charged on
Rights Bill Talks, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 16, 1991, at 7A ("Civil rights advocates charged on
Monday that the Bush administration has tried to sabotage their negotiations with business
leaders towards a compromise civil rights bill because it wants to keep the question of job
quotas alive as a political issue.").
2. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
3. In City of Richmond v. LA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), the Court imposed
strict scrutiny standards to overturn a city set-aside program. Id. at 493. Refusing to defer to
state interest, Justice O'Connor wrote that remedial schemes by state and local governments,
unlike those by Congress, are not grounded in a specific constitutional mandate to enforco
the Fourteenth Amendment, which serves as a check on state action premised on race. IL at
490. A majority of the Court concluded that societal discrimination was an inadequate
predicate for the Richmond set-aside program and that the standard of review for such
remedial policies is strict scrutiny. Id. at 493 (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor felt that "searching judicial inquiry" was necessary to identify benign or
remedial schemes, and "smoke out" illegitimate legislative action that is motivated by or is
the product of racial politics. Id. The Court found that the city lacked specific findings of
discrimination in the local construction industry. Id, at 505. It also found that the program
was not narrowly tailored or tied to any discriminatory harm being redressed, id. at 507,
randomly included racial groups for coverage, thereby making the plan over-inclusive, id at
506, and failed to consider race neutral alternatives such as capital and bonding assistance to
disadvantaged contractors of all races, id at 507-10. Justice Stevens found the program problematic because it was not premised on efficient performance in the public interest, represented legislative as opposed to judicial remediation, and promoted racial stereotypes. Id at 51216 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, although agreeing with the decision, wrote separately to voice his position on remedial schemes. He advocated for a consistent colorblind
standard for all racially motivated remedial efforts. Only in unusual situations such as disman-
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tling an officially segregated school system or in a life-threatening "social emergency" would
he deviate. Il at 520-24 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun
dissented. Writing for the dissenters, Justice Marshall noted that the record contained substantial evidence of discrimination of which Richmond was a part. As such, the city's goal of
eliminating the effects of discrimination and preventing the continuation of exclusionary policies, provided justification for its program. IL at 528-42. For these reasons, Justice Marshall
called for a lower standard of review, noting that:
Today, for the first time, a majority of this Court has adopted strict scrutiny as its
standard of Equal Protection Clause review of race-conscious remedial measures ....
A profound difference separates governmental actions that themselves
are racist, and governmental actions that seek to remedy the effects of prior racism
or to prevent neutral governmental activity from perpetuating the effects of such
racism.
IL at 551-52. Justice Marshall also distanced himself from the Court's limitation on state
action. Citing the legislative history of Reconstruction Amendments, he found nothing that
limited the states' exercise of police power to work with the federal government to redress
discrimination and its effects. Il at 557-60.
Bound by the standards set out in Croson, lower courts have found many state setaside programs unconstitutional. See, e.g., Main Line Paving Co. v. Board of Educ., 725 F.
Supp. 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (finding only generalized findings of discrimination, failure to
limit remediation to identified victims, and failure to narrowly tailor the program or consider
race and gender-neutral alternatives); Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 710 F.
Supp. 1532 (W.D. Wis.), modifying 707 F. Supp. 1016 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (finding that
Wisconsin program could not withstand strict scrutiny analysis); American Subcontractors
Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 376 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. 1989) (finding no evidence of discrimination
to support the program, and determining that the program was over-inclusive and failed to
consider race-neutral alternatives). But see Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 729 F. Supp.
734 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (program passes constitutional muster by being narrowly tailored to
remedy identified discrimination).
Croson and its progeny have spawned several legislative initiatives. See, e.g., Equal
Opportunity Authorization Act, S. 1235, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (intended to amend the
1964 Civil Rights Act so as to legislatively sanction set-asides). The proposed amendment
would constitute § 719 of Title VII and is captioned "SET ASIDES FOR STATES AND
POLITICAL SUBDMSIONS." Its provisions are:
(a) FINDINGS-Congress finds that(1) there has been a long and continual history of discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin by private contractors in
employment and subcontracting; and
(2) such discrimination has been exacerbated by states and the political
subdivisions of such states in awarding contracts.
(b) AUTHORIZATION-Congress, pursuant to its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, determines that States and the political subdivisions
of States may enact reasonable provisions setting aside a percentage of funds for
spending on contracts to be awarded to firms that have ownership, control, or employment practices which further the goal of remedying the discrimination referred
to in subsection (a).
L
Hearings were also conducted before the Committee on Government Operations, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). These hearings, which were investigative in nature, gathered documentation of continuing discrimination in the construction industry. For a discussion of the
legislative background and constitutionality of set-asides, see Stephen A. Plass, Judicial Versus
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Rights Act of 1964, with central focus on Title VII.5
The employment legislative fervor was triggered by several Supreme Court decisions. First, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins6 held that
an employer is not liable for discrimination if it would have made the
same decision absent consideration and reliance on prohibited considerations.7 In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio8 the Court determined that disparate impact plaintiffs must show more than disparity
to establish their case. Specifically, the wrongful practice must be
identified and causation must be shown. In addition, the Court lightened the employer's burden.9 Martin v. Wilkl' 0 increased the vulnerability of consent decrees to collateral attack," and Lorance v.
AT&T Technologies2 found that the statute of limitations for discriminatory seniority policies begins to run at the time such policies
are adopted, regardless of when they affect employees. 3 Additionally, the Court decided in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union14 that §
198115 covered only pre-contract discrimination, 6 and further ruled
in Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes"7 that plaintiffs can recover attorney's fees from losing intervenors only in limit-

Legislative Charting of National Economic Policy: Plotting a Democratic Course for Minority
Entrepreneurs, 24 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 655 (1991). In light of the fierce battle that was
necessary for a new civil rights law, and given powerful popular opposition to preferential
schemes, the odds are stacked against proponents of legislation that protects or prefers
minority entrepreneurs.
4. 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6
(1988)).
5. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-718, 78
Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988)). This
Article focuses primarily on the employment cases and legislative initiatives although relevant
equality principles from other contexts are sometimes referenced.
6. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
7. Id at 242 (discussing gender as being a prohibited consideration).
8. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
9. Id at 657. In effect the Court decided that the "bottom line" argument is as
ineffective in establishing plaintiff's case as it is in providing an employer with a defense.
See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (explaining that Title VII does not provide for
bottom line defense. The statute focuses on discriminatory bars to opportunities, not overall
results).
10. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
11. Id at 762-63.
12. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
13. Id at 906.
14. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
15. 42 U.S.C § 1981 (1988).
16. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 179.
17. 491 U.S. 754 (1989).
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ed circumstances."8
Part I of this Article discusses the original limitations of Title
VII for plaintiffs, and shows that the Court narrowed the statute further in the above-noted employment cases, among others. It then illustrates what appears to be the Court's methodical and permanent
move away from an analytical scheme grounded in the broad remedial purposes of civil rights legislation. The Article documents the
Court's constant reliance on "bedrock" Anglo-American jurisprudential
principles in deciding cases to highlight the shift from remedial purposes analysis to narrow textual construction as an enduring interpretive standard.
The first part further observes that injection of bedrock principles
and text-focused analysis into the civil rights area is not theoretically
negative, because of abundant deeply-rooted interpretive principles
favoring discrimination victims. Further, this part calls on the Court
to utilize supportive "American" rules as a symbol of its articulated
commitment to civil rights, while abiding by professed constitutional
and statutory demands of neutrality, strict scrutiny, and color blindness. Recognizing the potential benefits of textualism, the first part
argues that the 1991 Act can thrive under this interpretive methodology if analysis is free of judicial manipulation.
Part II of this Article analyzes the legislative proposals and demise of the Civil Rights Act of 1990, then proceeds to evaluate the
subsequent competing proposals that ultimately forged the 1991 legislation. The actual impact of the 1991 Act on Supreme Court decisions narrowing Title VII is carefully considered in an attempt to
predict what actual gains were made for employees that are discriminated against. This part also discusses other legislative gains that in
many instances were not tied to specific Court rulings. Part II concludes that while many significant gains were made for discrimination
victims, the 1991 Act is not a panacea, as partly evidenced by continuing legislative battles and judicial disagreement.
Part III studies the thorny problem of determining when the Act
takes effect. In this part, the Act's language and structure are evaluated, as well as its legislative history and various court decisions
construing it. This evaluation will highlight the internal conflicts of
the text, the contradictory statements of legislators, and conflicting
interpretations of judges. Although the Court has not articulated clear

18. Id at 761 (concluding that plaintiff must show that the intervenor's action "was
frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation").
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rules on the subject of retroactivity, this part predicts a construction
disfavoring retroactivity and subordinating the interest of employees,
despite the availability of substantial legal and policy reasons countenancing a different result.
Part IV analyzes the Court's fractured jurisprudence on affirmative action in employment cases, and the evolution of solid judicial
and popular theoretical opposition to remedial schemes. This part
specifically considers the effect of the 1991 Act on affirmative action
in view of the concerted effort by legislators to avoid this issue in
trying to secure passage of the 1991 legislation. Predicting a bleak
future for affirmative action, attention is also given to reparations, a
doubtful but increasingly discussed remedial device. In view of popu-'
lar judicial, legislative, and executive opposition to preferential
schemes, this part concludes that the quest for equal employment may
be stifled by a conservative Court, competing national priorities, and
changed societal attitudes. This part also concludes that broad-based
and powerful opposition to remediation makes forging ties with the
Court essential to the success of future civil rights protection.
I.

TITLE VII-ORIGINAL LEGISLATION AND CONSTRUCTION

A. Legislative Limitations of Title VII
As originally enacted, Title VII was the product of compromises
that accommodated the special interests of both businesses and union
leaders, while attempting to protect employee rights.' 9 Time and
again the limitations of these compromises were brought to light as
specific cases outside the wording of the statute compelled redress
grounded in the legislation's purpose as opposed to its textual mandate.2" Over the years, the statute has been increasingly utilized to
tackle subtle and sophisticated discriminatory schemes.2' Initially, a

19. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963).
20. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). In Weber,
the Court had to reconcile its prior holding in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273 (1976), that Title VII protects blacks and whites, with its decision to approve
voluntary plans negotiated by the company and union, which negatively impacted a white
employee. The Court found that Title VII's legislative history and its interpretation of §
7030) supported a conclusion that voluntary programs grounded in race are permissible.
Weber, 443 U.S. at 205-06.
21. See, e.g., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom.,
Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985). The subtle and sophisticated nature of present-day
discrimination is further insulated from attack by motive-based standards established by the
Court. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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supportive Supreme Court gave teeth to the statute by regarding it as
remedial 22 and construing its ambit as allowing motive-based inquiry,
as well as consideration of consequences. 3 Subsequent decisions setting out burden of proof requirements2 4 accommodated the difficulty
of proof for discrimination victims, while attempting to avoid unnecessary infringement on management and union prerogatives. 25 The
statute does not require quotas or racial balancing by employers.2 6
Although pitched and interpreted as a broad remedial measure,
Title VII provided limited relief to discrimination victims. 27 Injunctive and equitable relief formed the grist of its redress mechanism.28
Essentially limited to prospective injunctive mandates, reinstatement,
and back-pay, many injuries naturally and normally flowing from
violations30 went unremedied. 29 Non-wage injuries were often uncompensated.
Punitive and compensatory damages other than back pay were
unavailable. 3 These relief limitations impeded attainment of Title
VII's remedial and deterrence goals. As a result, Title VII plaintiffs
contemporaneously placed reliance on § 1981's32 complimentary re-

22. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
23. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
24. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Fumco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).
25. See Weber, 443 U.S. 193.
26. Id at 205-06.
27. See Bailey v. Great Lakes Canning, Inc., 908 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1990); Protos v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986); see
also Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982); Farmer v. ARA Servs., Inc., 660 F.
2d 1096, 1107 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that compensatory damages other than back pay are
not available under Title VII).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
29. Front pay has been given in some cases. See, e.g., Spears v. Board of Educ., 843
F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1988); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1986);
Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1985); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys.
Co., 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984).
30. Physical, mental, and psychological harm are typically uncompensated. See Brooms
v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989) (inferring no recovery for medical bills and
other non-wage injuries); Williams v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 627 F. Supp. 752
(W.D. Mo. 1986) (no recovery for emotional distress).
31. See Bruno v. Western Elec. Co., 829 F.2d 957 (10th Cir. 1987) (punitive damages);
Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984) (back pay); Johnson v. Al
Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1984) (punitive and compensatory
damages for emotional distress).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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medial provisions to fill the void. Section 1981 offers a full range of
compensatory 33 and punitive 4 relief possibilities to most class
members that Title VII protects. However, women are not captured
under § 1981's umbrella and are therefore limited to Title Vi's remedial scheme.
B.

Recent Court-Imposed Limitations

1. The Causation and Same Decision Test
According to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,35 an employer can
discriminate in ways prohibited by Title VII and avoid liability by
showing that it would have made the same decision absent the prohibited conduct.36 In that case, the Court was called upon to interpret the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII which prohibit employers from making employment decisions "because of' an
individual's sex. 37 It concluded that the language of the statute was
plain on its face in prohibiting employers from taking gender into
account.3' However, it found that common sense supported its construction that "because of" meant "relied on," and was not intended
as colloquial shorthand for "solely because of."39 Confirmation of

33. See Richards v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 668 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y 1987),
aftd, 842 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1988); Muldrew v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 728 F.2d 989 (8th
Cir. 1984).

34. See Williamson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1987);
Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431 (lth Cir. 1985).
35. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
36. See id at 258. Despite its contravention of the statutory mandate prohibiting the
consideration of sex in employment decisionmaking, the Price Waterhouse decision was
viewed in many quarters as a pro-plaintiff ruling. See Charles S. Ralston, Court vs. Congress:
Judicial Interpretation of the Civil Rights Acts and Congressional Response, 8 YALE L. &

POL'Y REv. 205 (1990); Charles A. Shanor & Samuel A. Marcosson, Battleground for a
Divided Court: Employment Discrimination in the Supreme Court, 1988-89, 6 LAB. LAW. 145
(1990). But see Roy L. Brooks, The Structure of Individual Disparate Treatment Litigation
After Hopkins, 6 LAB. LAW. 215, 231-32 (1990) (arguing that Price Waterhouse standards are
more favorable to employers than plaintiffs).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). This section provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.

38. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239-40 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 200Oe-2(a)(1) & (2)).
39. Id at 241. The premise for the Court's conclusion is partly based on recognition
that Title VI was designed to police mixed or dual motive cases. Id
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this construction was obtained by reference to the provision's legislative history which showed that an amendment to include the word
"solely" in front of "because of' was rejected. 40 The Court found
further support in the statute's structure by noting that elsewhere in
the statute's text there was a provision that allows employers to consider gender under specified circumstances'
Rejected was the
employee's contextual argument that the relief section of the statute
supported a finding of liability once a prohibited consideration played
a role in the employer's decision.4 2
Applying conventional rules of civil litigation,4 3 the Court went
on to hold that the employer's burden is governed by the "preponderance" of evidence standard.' The Court rejected the clear and convincing standard advocated by the plaintiff, finding that standard to be
the exception rather than the rule for determining liability. 45 In addressing the issue of causation, 6 the Court was not persuaded that
40. Id at 241 n.7.
41. Id at 242 (pointing to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e), which allows an employer to
consider gender if it is a bona fide occupational qualification).
42. Id at 244-45 n.10. The Court reasoned that the remedies provision could not
surmount statutory mandates in other provisions of the statute. I& at 245 n.10.
43. The Court was not shy in stating that for litigation purposes, Title VII cases should
be treated like any other civil case. Id at 253.
44. Id
45. Id ("Only rarely have we required clear and convincing proof where the action
defended against seeks only conventional relief.").
46. Id at 239-47. Causation issues have historically been thorny for courts analyzing
mixed-motive cases. Circuit courts had utilized a variety of approaches which included such
standards as "but for," "substantial factor," "motivating factor," or "discernible factor." Id at
238-39 n.2. While finding that plaintiff is not required to show the exact role an illegitimate
consideration played, the Court found that plaintiff must show that the employer relied on the
illegitimate consideration, id at 252, and that such reliance on the illegitimate factor was a
"motivating part" of the employer's decision, id at 244. The Court could not reach a consensus on how much evidence plaintiff needed to establish a prima fade case. However, a
requirement that plaintiff produce substantial evidence pervades the opinion. See Ed at 271
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (plaintiff needs direct evidence). The Court interpreted the "because
of" language in § 703(a) as contemplating and covering more than one reason for employer
conduct. Id at 241. Justice White, in concurrence, adopted the standards set out in ML

Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Boyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1978), on the premise that an
employee should not be better off because a protected right is infringed, when the employer
has legitimate reasons for acting. Justice White's approach would also require a showing that
the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor. Id at 259 (White, J.,concurring). Justice O'Connor interpreted the words "because of" to mean "but for" causation, see
id at 262-63 (O'Connor, J., concurring), analogizing this situation to common law tort actions. See id at 262-66. She found that once plaintiff showed that an illegitimate consideration was a substantial factor, the employer must prove that the same decision would have
been "justified" by legitimate reasons. Placing this risk of non-persuasion on the employer
was regarded by Justice O'Connor as comporting with the deterrence and make-whole purpos-
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the employer should be liable if wrongful conduct played "any" role
in the decisionmaking.47 Traditional legal principles supporting liability once fault is established were not adopted, which would have
facilitated taking the inquiry to the next step, where relief would be
determined in light of the equities favoring the employer.48 Even
after recognizing the statute's condemnation of illegitimate motives,49
the Court found that, on balance, employer prerogatives outweighed

es of Title VII. See kL at 261-77. O'Connor's concern about Title VIIs deterrence and
make-whole purposes is curious in light of her narrow views enunciated in Croson, and her
opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992-93 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), which was adopted in Wards Cove. The dissenting Justices' analysis in Price
Waterhouse departed from that of the other Justices. They found that the plain statutory
language tied liability to causation, and as a result, "but for" causation was needed to
establish liability. They also found that "because of" meant "solely because of" in view of
the fact that: 1) the presence or consideration of illegitimate motives is of no moment since
the employer does not commit a violation if it would have made the same decision for
legitimate reasons; and 2) any other construction would create internal conflict in the statute.
The dissenters further found that burden-shifting in Title VII litigation is inconsistent with
well-established burden allocations in this area. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 279-93 (Kennedy, L.,dissenting).
For a good analysis of the evolution and competing concerns affecting the Court's
causation jurisprudence, see Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shftling Doctrines in
Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64
TUL. L. REV. 1359, 1382-1405 (1990) [hereinafter Belton, Burden-Shifing]; Robert Belton,
Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235 (1988) [hereinafter
Belton, Causation] (discussing the confusion created by the Court's failure to distinguish
between causation analysis for determining Title VII liability as opposed to relief, and unhelpful references to decisional standards developed under the constitution).
47. Plaintiff was not able, however, to get the Court to bifurcate its analysis in this
fashion. Rather, the Court extended its liability analysis to include both illegitimate and
legitimate motives, noting that the statute preserved broad employer freedoms. See Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241.42. A finding of liability once the employer relies on any
illegitimate consideration is very important from a deterrence standpoint, even if the damages
assessed are nominal or negligible. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition 11:Price
Waterhouse and the Individual Employment Discrimination Case, 42 RUToERS L. REv. 1023,
1052-53 (1990) (arguing that the "same decision" test increases the probability that employers
will rely on prohibited factors, and thereby inhibits the legislative goal of a bias-free
workplace).
48. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 238. Plaintiff argued that the presence of legitimate reasons may serve to limit the relief granted but not to avoid a finding of liability once
it has been demonstrated that an illegitimate factor was considered. For some persuasive
commentaries supporting plaintiff's view, see Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the
Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 HAsNGs L.J. 471 (1990); Mark C. Weber,
Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed Motive Discrimination, 68
N.C. L. REV. 495 (1990). But see Belton, Causation, supra note 46.
49. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240. The Court found that the employer relied on
illegitimate factors, which is a possible technical violation. It went on to say, however, that
no actual violation can be found until the employer's legitimate considerations ar reviewed
as well. Id. at 237, 251.
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employee rights, thereby absolving from liability an employer with
legitimate explanations for its decision5 ° This new standard effectively deprived lower courts of traditional avenues of relief in mixedmotive cases5 1 Further, it had the potential to undermine the deterrence function of the statute by allowing employers to avoid liability
in some instances where discrimination is proven.5 2
2. Facially Neutral Policies and the Statute of LimitationsThe Clairvoyant Employee Problem
In Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,53 the Court held that the
statute of limitations for a facially neutral seniority policy that discriminated against women began to run from the time of its adoption.54 In interpreting Title VII's requirement that a charge be filed
"within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred," 55 the Court determined that the context of the
statute and text of another statutory scheme were adequate interpretive
tools. The Court never pointed to any recognized construction that
"occurred" meant "was adopted," and instead relied on the similarities
between Title VII and the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 56
and cases interpreting the NLRA.5 With heavy reliance on the

50. Id at 241-42.
51. In the past, lower courts granted attorney fees and ordered the employer to stop
discriminating even after the employer demonstrated that non-discriminatory reasons supported
its decision. See Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985); King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1984); Ostroff v. Employment Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 302
(9th Cir. 1982).
52. See, e.g., EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920 (1lth Cir. 1990) (Discrimination on the part of the employer was proven by direct evidence establishing that the
person responsible for promotion decisions had uttered a racial slur. However, the employer

was able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff would not have been
promoted even in the absence of a discriminatory motive, thus avoiding liability.); Gautier v.
Watkins, 747 F. Supp. 82 (D.D.C. 1990) (The court assumed that the plaintiff had made a
prima fade showing of racial discrimination. Plaintiff claimed that he was passed over for a
promotion because he was not black. However, the court stated that defendant was not liable
because they proved by a preponderance of the evidence that, in the absence of discrimination, the same decision would have been made.).
53. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
54. Id at 905. The Court cited Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981), Delaware
State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S.
553 (1977) for the proposition that the time of the discriminatory act, rather than the time of
the discriminatory consequences, is the proper focus. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 907.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
57. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 909-12. The dissent objected to the Court's construction,
arguing that it is unsupported by the text or precedents interpreting Title VII. Id at 915
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NLRA, and court precedents interpreting that statute, the Court made
the value judgment that the line must be drawn at the time the policy
was adopted.
As a result, the Court rejected plaintiff's "continuing violation"
argument 8 which was grounded on solid legal precedent,5 9 finding
this contention only "plausible. " 6° Therefore, it ruled that the statute
of limitations began to run long before the plaintiff was aware of,
affected by, or harmed by the policy.61 Past judicial flexibility in
pursuit of fairness62 in this area was replaced with a theoretical construct that is particularly harmful in view of evidence that discriminating employers are sophisticated, and capable of designing policies that
evade early recognition of their consequences.6 3

(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall observed that: "This severe interpretation of §
706(e) will come as a surprise to Congress, whose goals in enacting Title VII surely never
included conferring absolute immunity on discriminatorily adopted seniority systems that
survive their fiust 300 days." Id. at 914 (footnote omitted).
58. Id. at 905-07.
59. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,
455 U.S. 363 (1982); Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). Justice Marshall found:
Tellingly, none of the Courts of Appeals presented with a claim of a continuing
violation has reached the result the majority today reaches. Indeed, two of the
Courts of Appeals have interpreted our precedents to permit claims of continuing
violation. Even the Seventh Circuit, finding petitioners' claim time barred, in the
judgment under review, adopted a far narrower interpretation than the majority,
under which the limitations period begins to run on the date when the employee
first becomes subject to the seniority system.
Lorance, 490 U.S. at 919 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (fust emphasis in
original).
60. Id at 908. In evaluating the discriminatory impact model for seniority claims, the
Court found that, "[a]s an original matter this is a plausible, and perhaps even the most
natural, reading of § 703(h)." Id
61. Id. at 914 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (the decision requires "employees to sue
anticipatorily or forever hold their peace").
62. See Johnson v. General Elec., 840 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1988); Halferty v. Pulse Drug
Co., 821 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1987); Cook v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 771 F.2d 635 (2d
Cir. 1985); Hall v. Ledex, Inc., 669 F.2d 397 (6th Cir. 1982); Jenkins v. Home Ins. Co., 635
F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1980); Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1973)
(accepting continuing violation theory); see also Glass v. Petro-Tex Chem. Corp., 757 F.2d
1554 (5th Cir. 1985) (using "the degree of permanence that would trigger awareness" approach); Berry v. Board of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1983).
63. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 917 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The distinction the majority
erects today serves only to reward those employers ingenious enough to cloak their acts of
discrimination in a facially neutral guise, identical though the effects of this system may be

to those of a facially discriminatory one.").
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Concerns about stale claims' and disruptive influences65 on
seniority systems overwhelmed the national interest in prohibiting discrimination in employment.' This analysis also failed to consider
that employers and unions may use seniority systems to perpetuate a
legacy of discrimination,' which in some respects has been accommodated by the Court. 68 Insulating and "immunizing"6 9 such systems from attack, therefore, destroys the viability of many meritorious
claims by making them unenforceable.
Decisional law since Lorance has broadened its scope and application.7" For example, in Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co., 7 plaintiff
protested his termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 72 only to find Lorance controlling and his
claim barred by the 300 day statute of limitations period in the
ADEA.73 The court cited the short limitations period in the statutory
scheme and the disruptive influences noted in Lorance as support for
its conclusion.7 4 The court held that the statute began to run when
Colgan received an unfavorable evaluation, not three months later
when he was discharged.75 It further found no difficulty in relying
on Title VII precedents to resolve the ADEA claim. 6

64. Id at 914.
65. Id
66. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 174 (1989) ("[E]very pronouncement of this Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders attest a firm
national policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination.'" (quoting Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983))).
67. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); International Bhd. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
68. Id; see also Lorance, 490 U.S. 900 (reaffirming the primacy of seniority in employment relations, the need for proof of discriminatory purpose in attacking such systems, and
the legitimacy of a seniority system even if its operation leads to discriminatory consequences).
69. See id at 915 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. Beavers v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 751 F. Supp. 956, 960-61 (N.D. Ala.
1990) (extending Lorance to insurance and medical benefit claims and rejecting plaintiff's
contention that the Lorance analysis was grounded on the special nature of seniority systems).
71. 747 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Pa. 1990), vacated, 935 F.2d 1407 (3d Cir.), and cert.
denied, 112 S. CL 379 (1991).
72. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
73. Colgan, 747 F. Supp. at 303; see also Hamilton v. First Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86
(4th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. City Colleges, 740 F. Supp. 508, 514-15 (N.D. 111.1990), aff'd,
944 F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1991).
74. Colgan, 747 F. Supp. at 302-03.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 301 n.3.
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Similarly, in Hendrix v. Yazoo City, the Fifth Circuit relied on
Lorance in departing from its continuing violation methodology" in
analyzing Fair Labor Standards Act7 9 claims. 0 In Kuemmerlein v.
Board of Education of Madison Metropolitan School District,81 a §
198382 case, primary reliance was placed on Lorance and the need
for certainty and protection against stale claims to justify a similar result. 3 Further, in Addison v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.,84 a case arising under the Railway Labor Act," a federal district court relied on
Lorance in rejecting plaintiffs' claims as "attempts to rekindle stale
grievances in the light of more recent events.""s
3. Tougher Disparate Impact Burdens
Before Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,87 Title VII plaintiffs
had two litigation models. The first model, "disparate treatment,"
focused on the employer's motive8 in decisionmaking, while the
second model, "disparate impact," focused on the consequences of the
employer's conduct.8 9 Although the text of section 703 of Title VII
did not specifically provide for impact suits, the Court initially gave
this language an interpretation grounded in its legislative history."° It

77. 911 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1990).
78. Id, at 1103. The court cited Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., 821 F.2d 261 (5th Cir.
1987), as its most recent holding approving the continuing violation theory. Hendrix, 911
F.2d at 1104.
79. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.
80. Hendrix, 911 F.2d at 1104.
81. 894 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1990).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
83. Kuemmerlein, 894 F.2d at 260.
84. 745 F. Supp. 343 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
85. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988).
86. Addison, 745 F. Supp. at 348.
87. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
88. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977).
89. See id. But see Blunrosen, supra note 47, at 1058-59 (stating that the Court's
interpretation in Teamsters narrowed Title VII's range by creating two hard categories-disparate treatment and disparate impact, thereby excluding unconscious discrimination
which results in unequal treatment).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
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determined that Title VII was directed at any arbitrary or artificial
barrier that operates to freeze the status quo of past discriminatory
practices."
Although the specific issue was not before the Wards Cove
Court, it determined that it was timely and appropriate to outline
new standards for disparate impact plaintiffs.93 It found that such
plaintiffs must identify each specific practice that is alleged to be unlawful.' Then, a showing must be made of how each practice causes a significant disparate impact.9' This approach represents a departure from past construction and prior recognition by courts that a
group of employment practices producing a disparate impact is sufficient for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case.'
Further, the Court found that an employer is no longer required
to show that the challenged practice was "essential" 97 or "significantly correlated"" to the job. Rather, the employer's burden was reduced to a showing that the practice "serves" 9 legitimate employment goals. Moreover, to establish this defense, the employer need

employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
91. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); see also Connecticut v. Teal,
457 U.S. 440, 450-51 (1982) (holding that § 703(a)(2) is broad, and captures facially neutral
limitations and classifications that serve as barriers to equal employment opportunities; thus,
plaintiffs could pursue a discrimination claim by relying on statistical data even though
evidence of employer intent to discriminate was unavailable).
92. Once the Court had determined that plaintiff's statistics did not show disparate
impact, its review role was arguably over. The Court's eagerness to make a mark in this area
was telegraphed by Wards Cove's predecessor, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 1000-01 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that the plurality was out of
bounds for discussing plaintiffs' burden because the only issue before the Court was whether
employer's use of subjective criteria was covered by the "impact" theory).
93. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-62 (1989).
94. Id at 656.
95. Id.
96. See Power v. Alabama Dep't of Educ., 854 F.2d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1107 (1989); Green v. U.S.X. Corp., 843 F.2d 1511, 1520 (3d Cir. 1988),
vacated, 490 U.S. 1103 (1989); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271-72 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985); see also Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1529 (11th
Cir. 1985); Williams v. City and County of San Francisco, 483 F. Supp. 335, 340 (N.D. Cal.
1979), rev'd, 685 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1982).
97. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977).
98. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
99. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
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only "produce""'" evidence of business justification."°1 Plaintiffs
were further saddled with the responsibility of showing that the practice was not justified by business needs." 2
In essence, Wards Cove overruled the existing interpretation of
disparate impact proof requirements which was formulated approximately two decades ago by a unanimous Supreme Court and effectively fleshed out since then. 3 Wards Cove's proof requirements,
in effect, eliminated the distinction between treatment and impact cases" by rejecting the prior interpretation that Title VII is directed
primarily at discriminatory consequences, not motive.' 5 Coming at
a time when proof of motive is very difficult to acquire in discrimination cases, Wards Cove represented an overwhelming challenge for
Title VII plaintiffs.
Rather than face an outcry from overruling statutory civil rights
precedents, °6 the Court humbled itself to having written unclear
opinions, susceptible to varying interpretations." 7 Anticipating the
burdens"' that the new requirements placed on plaintiffs, solace
was offered in liberal, albeit deficient, discovery rules," 9 and the
holding's conformity "with the usual method" of burden allocation." The move to judicial "business as usual" represents a depar-

100. Id

101. Id,
102. Id
103. Business necessity proof had traditionally been the responsibility of defendant. See
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Albemarle
Paper, 422 U.S. at 425; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
104. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 669-71 (Stevens, L, dissenting).
105. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; see also H.IL 238, 92d Cong., IstSess. 8 (1972)
(ride VII intended to reach "all"
discriminatory practices).
106. See Griggs, 401 U.S. 424, and its progeny. The dissenters in Wards Cove commented that the majority's holding was tantamount to a summary rejection of the construction
given this statute as evidenced by prior Court decisions. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 671-72
(Stevens, J.,dissenting). They also pointed to congressional acquiescence and approval of
prior interpretations by utilizing the previously established standard in later statutory schemes.
Id. at 666 n.9.
107. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660 (stating "[w]e acknowledge that some of our earlier
decisions can be read as suggesting otherwise").
108. The Court fully understood that requiring impact plaintiffs to show each wrongful
practice with specificity, as well as causation, is extremely demanding. Id at 657. The very
fact of plaintiffs inability to get "smoking gun" proof had necessitated an interpretation of
Title VII allowing impact claims.
109. Id at 657. The dissent highlighted the deficiency of this proposition by noting that
in the case at bar, defendant did not maintain the required information that arguably made
discovery rules advantageous. Id at 673 n.20 (Stevens, L, dissenting).
110. Id at 659-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, the dissent noted that proof require-
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ture from past construction and sensitivity shown for impact plaintiffs,111 and reflects a new selective application of standards."'
However, the Court's relief rules did not follow traditional recovery principles. Specifically, no affirmative obligation was placed on
culpable defendants since their legal obligation could be met by
"adopting" the correct behavior which plaintiff is required to fashion.113 Justice Stevens regarded such primary sensitivity to employer
concerns as the Court's "latest sojourn into judicial activism.""t 4
The decision's impact was immediate, and lower court judges quickly
confirmed that Wards Cove wrought dramatic changes in disparate
impact standards 1 and employment discrimination law generally. 6 Scholars also quickly observed that the decision was not supported by the statute, court precedents interpreting it or proof principles governing this area. 7

ments previously allocated to employers were no different than for a typical affrmative
defense. Il at 670.
111. In the past, impact plaintiffs who established their prima facie case typically prevailed unless the employer could show business necessity. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
112. In rejecting a requirement that employers show the practice to be essential or
indispensable, the Court noted that, "this degree of scrutiny would be almost impossible for
most employers to meet . . . ." Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659. Further, while the Court was
all too willing to get involved in "costs" and "burdens" evaluation of plaintiff's proffered
alternative practice, it instantly lost competence when evaluating the employer implemented
practice being challenged. lit at 653.
113. According to the Court, after plaintiff has identified the specific practice, proved
causation, and proved the existence of equally effective, less discriminatory alternatives, the
employer need only adopt these alternatives to avoid liability. Id. at 659-61.
114. Id, at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. See Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that Wards Cove
changed the "ground rules" lower courts previously followed for disparate impact cases, and
brought about a dramatic change in the law).
116. See Green v. USX Corp., 896 F.2d 801, 804 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that Wards
Cove brought "significant changes in employment discrimination law"); see also Hill v.
Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 885 F.2d 804, 812 n.12 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that Wards
Cove overruled the law on business necessity in that circuit).
117. See, e.g., L. Camille HMbert, Redefining the Burdens of Proof in Title VII Litigation:
Will the DisparateImpact Theory Survive Wards Cove and the Civil Rights Act of 1990?, 32
B.C. L. REv. 1 (1990) (tracing the legislative and judicial evolution of impact theory and
arguing for its continuing application as a distinct theory of recovery); Candace S. KovacicFleiseher, Proving Discrimination After Price Waterhouse and Wards Cove: Semantics as
Substance, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 615 (1990) (arguing that the Court mistakenly relied on
"presumption" principles in deciding Wards Cove, and emphasizing the need to distinguish
between presumption and inference, as well as production and persuasion when deciding cases
in this area).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:313

4. Limiting the Scope of § 1981
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,118 the Court was called
upon to interpret the antidiscrimination mandate of § 1981119 in the
"making and enforcement"120 of contracts. The Court held that this
provision does not prohibit discrimination on the job and is limited to
discrimination in the hiring process.
Applying plain meaning"
construction principles, the Court determined that the "making" prong
only related to discriminatory refusals to contract, or offers to contract, on discriminatory terms."n The "enforcement"2 4 prong was
determined to be specifically related to equal or nondiscriminatory
access to legal processes."n Amidst claims of fidelity to the national
policy prohibiting discrimination, 2 6 the Court glossed over the com-

118. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
120. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171.
121. Id at 177. The Court determined that neither logic nor semantics could justify an
interpretation that extended § 1981 coverage to postformation conduct. Id The suggestion that
logic might have persuaded the Court to rule differently is misleading, since the Court had
flatly rejected logic in interpreting another civil rights statute. See Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 907 n.3 (1989) (rejecting the most natural and plausible reading of
§ 703(h) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
122. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176. Rather than trace the legislative history to get a general
sense of the statute's purpose and essence, the Court opted for a mechanical conclusory starting point finding that Congress intended to grant only two limited rights in § 1981: one
right to make contracts, the other to enforce contracts. Id
123. Id.
124. Id
125. Id at 177. The Court found that this prong was designed to prohibit "discrimination
that infects the legal process in ways that prevent one from enforcing contract rights, by reason of his or her race. . . ." Id
126. Id at 174 ("[E]very pronouncement of this Court and myriad Acts of Congress and
Executive Orders attest a firn national policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination." (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983))). Then, in an almost
apologetic fashion, the Court concluded thatThe law now reflects society's consensus that discrimination based on the color of
one's skin is a profound wrong of tragic dimension. Neither our words nor our
decisions should be interpreted as signaling one inch of retreat from Congress'
policy to forbid discrimination in the private, as well as the public, sphere.
Id at 188. One need only read this conservative Court's civil rights decisions, however, to
ascertain the "miles" of retreat in this area. Of late, the Court has been forthcoming in
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pelling legislative history supporting a broader construction. 2 7
Although the Court conceded that offers with discrininatory
terms fall within the ambit of § 1981 at the formation stage,128 it
rejected a construction and test that would catch postformation conduct that "belie[s] any claim that the contract was entered into in a
racially neutral manner."' 29 Extensive discussion and reliance on
stare decisis principles were substituted for a fair consideration of the
statute's text, its legislative history, and the legal nuances of at-will
employment.1" Further, the Court's reliance on stare decisis as the
basis of its decision and the observation that "correctness" is not its
governing standard suggested that the reasons offered were
pretextual.1 31 The Court went on to find that postformation conduct

openly recognizing discrimination and the harm it causes. See City of Richmond v. l.A.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is plainly true that in our
society blacks have suffered discrimination immeasurably greater than any directed at other
racial groups.-); wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 278 n.5 (1986) ("No one
disputes that there has been race discrimination in this country.'). However, the Court has not
gotten beyond acknowledgment of harm worked by discrimination. Rather, constitutional colorblindness has been introduced as a standard for all seasons, at a time when its greatest utility
is in blocking remedial efforts. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-93. It is ironic, therefore, that
color-blindness was relegated to dissent in past constitutional analysis in order to pave the
way for majoritarian race-based advantage. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 55264 (1896) (Harlan, I., dissenting).
127. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 174-75. Justice Brennan, in dissent, cited extensive legislative
history to support his and other dissenters' conclusion that § 1981 was intended to apply
beyond refusals to contract in a nondiscriminatory manner. Id at 189-219 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). He noted that "[s]ection 1 of the Civil Rights Act was also designed to protect
the freedmen from the imposition of working conditions that evidence an intent on the part
of the employer not to contract on nondiscriminatory terms." Id at 206 (citations omitted).
128. Id at 176-77.
129. See id at 166. For this construction, the dissent proposed a test of "severe or
pervasive" conduct, id at 208 (Brennan, J., dissenting), which was rejected by the majority.

130. See Mack A. Player, What Hath Patterson Wrought? A Study in the Failure to
Understand the Employment Contract, 6 LAB. LAW. 183, 187 (1990) (contending that the
Court gave a grudging interpretation of § 1981 and failed to understand that at-will employ-

ment is not a monolithic relationship).
131. Some observers believed that the Court wanted to overrule Runyon and tested the
waters by ordering the parties to brief and argue the legality of that case. This decision was
greeted with public outrage which may have caused the Court to recoil. See Lawrence C.
Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis,
88 MicH. L. REV. 177, 179 n.12 (1989); see also Reginald C. Govan, Framing Issues and

Acquiring Codes: An Overview of the Legislative Sojourn of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 1057, 1063 (1992) (the Court's decision to review Runyon "unleashed a
firestorm of opposition from Congress, religious groups and the civil rights and labor communities, all of whom filed amicus briefs"). In Patterson, the Court went to great lengths to
emphasize the importance of the rule of law over the erratic proclivities of men. Yet the
Court concluded that the "prevailing sense of justice" in this country is the controlling
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was actionable under the broader proscriptions of Title VII, 13 2 and
that such specific coverage lessened the need for a different interpretation. 133 The Court also found that its construction did not frustrate
the objectives of the statute."
Like the other civil rights cases, Patterson untied the construction of civil rights statutes from its moorings of purpose. Analysis of
discrimination claims under § 1981 was approached in a narrow manner, despite broad legislative goals and the potential resultant discriminatory consequences of a narrow construction. 135 As such, this integral part of and complement to Title VII was construed to be avail36
able to victims of discrimination only in limited circumstances.1
The decision's impact
was immediate, and numerous cases have dem37
effects.1
its
onstrated
5. Eroding the Integrity of Consent Decrees
In Martin v. WilkS,1 3 the Court addressed the increasing hostil-

standard. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 174. The Court found that: "Whethzr Runyon's interpretation
of § 1981 as prohibiting racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private
contracts is right or wrong as an original matter, it is certain that it is not inconsistent with
the prevailing sense of justice in this country." Id Further, rather than be guided by "growth
of judicial doctrine," or legislative history, the Court ruled that "whether or not Runyon was
correct as an initial matter, there is no special justification for departing here from the rule
of stare decisis." Id at 175 nl. While this self-contradiction is flagrant and disheartening, it
does illuminate the human proclivities of members of the Court and their response to societal
proclivities in opposition to remedial schemes. To some extent, it adopts Justice Rehnquist's
personal conclusion that men cannot fashion laws to create an equitable multiracial society.
See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Reed, 445 U.S. 935, 938 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
132. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 180. The Court pointed to its "implicit" approval of harassment actions under Title VII, where the conduct is severe and pervasive enough to alter
working conditions and create an abusive environment. Id
133. Id at 181.
134. Id at 180-82.
135. Id at 189 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[The Court] . . . gives this landmark civil
rights statute a needlessly cramped interpretation. The Court has to strain hard to justify this
choice to confme § 1981 within the narrowest possible scope, selecting the most pinched
reading ...
[and] ignoring powerful evidence about the Reconstruction Congress' concerns.

. . .).

136. Discrimination victims have placed heavy reliance in the past on § 1981 because of
its broad relief scheme which includes jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages, all
of which are unavailable under Title VII.
137. See, e.g., Carroll v. General Accident Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1990);
Council v. City of Topeka, No. 88-4195-5 (D. Kan. Jan. 11, 1990); Coleman v. Domino's
Pizza, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1528 (S.D. Ala. 1990); Miller v. Shawmut Bank of Boston, N.A.,
726 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1989).
138. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
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ity to consent decrees, manifested in the form of reverse discrimination suits. The Court found that a court-approved consent decree that
provided notice, and facilitated a hearing and consideration of objections of interested parties, did not preclude individuals who were not
joined in the litigation from later challenging the decree. 39 Using in
personam jurisdiction principles as authority, the Court determined
that white firefighters who sat by the sidelines and did nothing while
the decree was being formulated must still have their day in
14 °

court.

Once the issue was framed in deep-rooted Anglo-American jurisprudential terms, it was decided that all the protections afforded
nonparties by mandatory intervention and joinder rules should govern. 4 1 No credence was given to the "impermissible collateral attack" 142 argument, although its widespread adoption by the circuits
had made it the majority rule. 43 Although conceding the strong
public policy in favor of voluntary affirmative action plans,'" and
recognizing the burdens mandatory joinder entails for civil rights litigants,14 no accommodation to preserve the integrity of consent decrees was made. Rather, the Court conveniently laid blame on the
"Rules" as compelling its conclusion.'4 6

139. Id at 758-59.
140. Id. at 761-63. Justice Stevens, in dissent, developed the competing truism in AngloAmerican jurisprudence that an interested or affected party may be disadvantaged or harmed
if that person sits idly by on the sidelines and watches the litigation take place. Id at 76977 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While a party failing to intervene or not joined cannot be
deprived of legal rights, the grounds for later attack become narrower because that
individual's status is one of collateral attacker versus appellant. Id at 771-72 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
141. Id at 764-68. Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was therefore
deemed controlling.
142. Id at 762-63 n.3. At the time the case was decided, the Court could only identify
one other circuit that allowed nonparties to attack consent decrees. Id at 763 n.3.
143. Referring to petitioners impermissible attack argument, the Court found: "The
position has sufficient appeal to have commanded the approval of the great majority of the
federal courts of appeals . . . ." Id at 762 (footnote omitted). Absent from the Court's finding is the law and logic that persuaded circuit courts to take this approach.
144. See id at 761.
145. Id at 766-67 (noting burdening factors such as the difficulty in identifying adverse
claimants who may be numerous, the potential for inconsistent judgments stemming from
failure to join, and wasted resources on duplicative litigation). The Court maintained that civil
rights plaintiffs must bear these risks and burdens although they have "less able shoulders."
Id at 767.
146. See id (stating that "[e]ven if we were wholly persuaded by these arguments as a
matter of policy, acceptance of them would require a rewriting rather than an interpretation of
the relevant Rules"). For a more expansive argument in support of the application of Rule
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The Court's adoption of stringent intervention and joinder rules
represented an avoidance of equally compelling permissive rules that
it had previously determined satisfy due process concerns.1 47 Further, by sheltering all "adversely affected" 148 persons under the
mandatory joinder and intervention umbrella, a large number of affirmative action plans and consent decrees were open to attack by a
showing that individuals were "affected," 149 even if they had intenThe elimination of
tionally bypassed opportunities to intervene."
finality attributes attendant to consent decrees may have led to a true
"litigation bonanza,"' thereby eroding settlements as the preferred
mode of resolving discrimination disputes.
The Wilks decision created a battle of attrition environment for
civil rights litigants. Many settlements and affirmative action plans
that were regarded as firm gains became vulnerable to new challenges. By destroying finality and predictability of past judgments and

19, see Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the
Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 236
(1992) (arguing that vested "seniority-based property rights," in conjunction with the reliance

and expectational interests of white public sector employees, command the procedural due
process protection of Rule 19, and suggesting that the "burdens" of remediation should be
allocated to the employer, while recognizing that white incumbents benefitted from the
employer's discriminatory conduct).
147. See Tulsa Professional Collection Serv. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988); Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950) (finding that notice and opportunity to be heard satisfy due process and are sufficient
to preclude collateral attack). The dissent in Wiks stated that:
There is nothing unusual about the fact that litigation between adverse parties may,
as a practical matter, seriously impair the interests of the third persons who elect
to sit on the sidelines. Indeed, in complex litigation this Court has squarely held
that a sideline-sitter may be bound as firmly as an actual party if he had adequate
notice and a fair opportunity to intervene and if the judicial interest in finality is
sufficiently strong.
490 U.S. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
148. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 766-70.
149. Il at 767.
150. See id at 768 ("Insofar as the argument is bottomed on the idea that it may be
easier to settle claims among a disparate group of affected persons if they are all before the
court, joinder bids fair to accomplish that result as well as a regime of mandatory intervention."); cf. id at 770-71 (Stevens, L,dissenting). The dissent argued that:
There is no reason . . . why the consent decree might not produce changes in
conditions at the white firefighters' place of employment that, as a practical matter,
may have a serious effect on their opportunities for employment or promotion even
though they are not bound by the decrees in any legal sense.
Id

151. President Bush, in vetoing the Civil Rights Act of 1990, characterized it as a
litigation bonanza. 136 CONG. REC. S16562 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990). The Wilks decision
will more likely create a litigation bonanza in the form of reverse discrimination suits.
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settlements, Wilks broadened the battlefront immeasurably, thereby
spreading civil rights advocates very thin. Although a few minorities
have benefitted"' from Wilks, the decision's primary utility has
been in dismantling hard-won gains.'
6. Insulating Losing Intervenors from Attorney's Fees
Soon after deciding Wilks, the Court decided Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes.'" This case presented the specific issue of whether losing intervenors were liable for plaintiffs'
attorney's fees under section 706(k) 55 of Title VII.'5 The Court
found that losing intervenors are liable only when their actions could
be regarded as "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation."157
To reach this conclusion, the Court elevated the American rule that
winners generally are not entitled to attorney's fees from losers,15
over the text-specific "prevailing party" standard in the statute. 159 In
effect, the Court used a general recovery principle to trump plain text.
The Court supplemented its conclusion with another general principle
that fees liability and merits liability run together,"6 while paying
152. See, e.g., Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 339-41 (6th Cir. 1990)
(allowing the class of black applicants and employees to intervene in reverse discrimination
case brought by white applicants); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918,
921-23 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that a consent decree entered on female employee's behalf,
but to which she was not a party, is not res judicata to the Title VII claim against employer); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 735 F. Supp. 1126, 1132-33 (D. Conn.
1990) (holding that an agreement to a promotional process in earlier decree is not a bar to
new discrimination claims); Richardson v. Lamar County Bd. of Educ., 729 F. Supp. 806,
812-13 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (holding that a settlement under a consent decree is not res judicata
because state and county boards' interests were not aligned).
153. See Riddle, 902 F.2d 918; Bridgeport Guardians, 735 F. Supp. 1126; Richardson,
729 F. Supp. 806.
154. 491 U.S. 754 (1989).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides:
In any action or proceeding under this subehapter the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
156. Zipes, 491 U.S. at 755.
157. Id at 760 (citation omitted).
158. Id at 758.
159. The prevailing party approach was established to facilitate and encourage private
enforcement of Title VII. See generally Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400,
402 (1968). Despite that statute's literal wording, the Court in Zipes determined that the
argument that the prevailing party must be given primacy was a non sequitur. Instead, it
offered the tortured explanation that: "To say that only the prevailing party gets fees is not
to say that the prevailing party's interests are always first and foremost in determining
whether he gets them." Zipes, 491 U.S. at 760 (emphasis in original).
160. See id at 763. In Alyeska Pipeline Sere. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
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lip service to the statutory discretion granted lower courts that was
clearly provided for in section 706(k). 161 The Court also disregarded
precedents establishing that fee payment is not inextricably tied to liability, 62 and substituted its judgment for that of Congress, which it
rationalized with assumptions about what Congress intended.'63
Although the Court recognized the chilling effect its decision
would have on Title VII plaintiffs,"6 it established an environment
where intervenors can drain plaintiffs' resources by re-litigating issues
which plaintiffs have already prevailed on. 65 Further, the Court
took the opportunity to polish the image of intervenors,"6 who in
Title VII litigation essentially function as plaintiffs' adversaries. 67

(1975), the Court held that absent statutory authorization, attorney fees should not generally
be awarded to winning parties. It further held that awards under a court's inherent powers
are limited to common fund and benefit, or bad faith situations. Id at 257-60. Unfortunately,
Title VII does not specifically deal with fee awards against losing intervenors. See Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 164 (1985) (holding that where statute does not specify, loser
should pay). This leaves much room for an interpretation that promotes private enforcement
of the statute, which holds intervenors who essentially function as plaintiffs adversaries
responsible for aggravating plaintiff's litigation costs. See Vulcan Soc'y of Westchester
County, Inc. v. Fire Dep't, 533 F. Supp. 1054, 1061-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
A different situation is presented when the traditionaj civil rights plaintiff is a defendant intervenor, as in cases where such plaintiffs join with employers to defend challenges to
affirmative action programs on reverse discrimination grounds. In such cases where defendantintervenor is a functional plaintiff, an award of fees to a prevailing defendant also promotes
the underlying goals of the statute by giving minorities incentive to vindicate civil rights
violations. See Baker v. City of Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841, 850-51 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (avoiding the Court's holding in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), that
prevailing defendants must show plaintiffs case was groundless or frivolous to get fee award,
and awarding fees through liberal construction of the Fees Award Act). Similar analysis was
utilized in the voting rights area. See Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 245-49 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 1204 (1983); see also Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d
128, 132 (6th Cir. 1979) (desegregation); Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. City of Akron,
604 F. Supp. 1268, 1273-74 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (abortion).
161. Zipes, 491 U.S. at 772 (Marshall, J.,dissenting) (noting that "the majority...
ignores Congress' explicit conferral of discretion on the district courts, and instead establishes
an absolute rule that, in all circumstances, a court must treat an intervenor like a plaintiff for
fee liability purposes") (footnote omitted).
162. Id at 771-72.
163. Id at 758-60.
164. See id at 762 ("Even if the inability generally to recover fees against intervenors
did create some marginal disincentive against Title VII suits .. ").
165. While the majority focused on how much the culpable defendant had spent on
attorney's fees, it paid no attention to the financial hardship that intervenors imposed on the
plaintiff. See id. at 761-62. Harm to plaintiff was noted by the dissent to be approximately
$200,000 after three years of litigation. Id at 770-71.
166. Intervenors were variously referred to as blameless, innocent, not disfavored by
Congress, welcome, and promoting vigorous adversary proceedings. Id at 761-66.
167. The Court correctly noted that an intervenor can advance the same arguments as
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In placing the interests of intervenors on the same footing as that of
plaintiffs, the Court restructured the hierarchical scheme Congress
established in the statute for determining attorney fee awards."ra By
limiting the discretion that Congress gave lower courts in plain permissive language, the Court disregarded textual directives it selectively advocated as the key to statutory construction. 6 9
To make matters worse, the Court expanded its ruling to collateral attacks. 7 Although the issue was not before it,' nor decided
in Wilks as suggested,"7 the Court stated that Wilks "establishes that
a party affected by the decree in a Title VII case need not intervene
but may attack the decree collaterally-in which suit the original Title
VII plaintiff defending the decree would have no basis for claiming
attorney's fees." 73 This broad-brushed approach triggered Justice
Marshall's response that the collateral
attack statement constituted
"conclusory dicta of the worst kind."174
The likely consequence of Zipes is that Title VII defendants will
increase their reliance on intervenors to raise their defenses, and
thereby minimize their fee exposure. 75 Already constrained by limited resources, 76 plaintiffs may be forced to accept discriminatory
conduct, which in effect constructively discharges them from their
position as private attorneys general."

defendant. Id at 765. This assessment is an understatement, because if intervenors were allied
to plaintiffs, the Zipes decision would probably have been welcomed by the civil rights
community.
168. Although the Court recognized congressional desires to equip discrimination victims
to enforce Title VII through the award of attorney fees, it nonetheless disregarded potent
legislative history that refuted its interpretation. Id at 758-60.
169. Justice Marshall observed that even congressional hostility to categorical rules in this
area did not serve as a restraint on the Court. Id at 771 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170. See id at 762-65.

171. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, set out the issue in the opening paragraph: "In
this case we must determine under what circumstances § 706(k) permits a court to award
attorney's fees against intervenors who have not been found to have violated the Civil Rights
Act or any other federal law." Id at 755.
172. See i at 762.
173. Id
174. Id at 777 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175. Id at 780 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176. "Without the hope of obtaining compensation for the expenditures caused by intervenors, many victims of discrimination will be forced to forgo remedial litigation for lack of
financial resources." IL "Congress recognized that victims of discrimination often lack the
resources to retain paid counsel, and frequently are unable to attract lawyers on a contingency
basis . . . ." IL at 773 (citation omitted).
177. See id at 758-59; see also id at 772 ("Given the scarcity of public resources
available for enforcement," private individuals are the primary enforcers of civil rights laws).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 21:313

Already confined by the compromises of the legislative process,
Title VII was clearly not a panacea for discrimination victims. The
Court's narrow construction only served to diminish the statute's potential for achieving its goal of a discrimination-free workplace.
C.

The Bedrock Jurisprudence Rationale

The use of constitutional, statutory, or common law theories to
resolve Title VII issues is flawed in the first instance because of their
different genesis and genre."' But flaws aside, application of "bedrock"179 Anglo-American principles is not, as a general proposition,
a harmful reference point for civil rights plaintiffs. However, the selective use of bedrock principles to defeat fair employment claims
betrays the Court's commitment to achieving the goals of civil rights
legislation.
There is no shortage of bedrock principles to support the claims

178. Many of the common law analogies were developed in the Price Waterhouse case.
Because causation issues naturally spring from employer reliance on legitimate and illegitimate
considerations, this area has been one of bountiful legal critique. See, e.g., Theodore Y.
Plumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook
on a Statutory Task 69 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1990) (Professors Blumoff and Lewis illustrate the
defect of analogizing mixed-motive analysis under Title VII to "but for" causation analysis in
tort theory. They point out that multiple forces tort cases lack a motivation element that
makes the legality of a defendant's actions irrelevant. They further point out that tort theory
presupposes the existence of truly independent forces coming together to cause harm, while
Title VII contains a statutory proscription that certain factors not be considered. And that
separating discriminatory from legitimate motives in an employer's thought process is virtually
impossible.); Blurmrosen, supra note 47, at 1035-37 (arguing that reliance on constitutional
analysis in Mt. Healthy and the National Labor Relations Act in Teamsters to resolve mixedmotive cases is tantamount to blaming employees for being members of protected groups-a
condition they have no control over); idL at 1042 ('Psychological forces cannot be measured
by the same calculus used for physical mechanical forces.").
At the relief stage, common law analogies would be equally misleading. Contract and
tort remedies, for example, are not confined by damage caps and discretionary injunctive and
declaratory relief rules. Rather, they provide a panoply of remedies not available in the
employment discrimination area.
179. See, e.g., First Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991); Lankford v.
Idaho, 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 228 (1990); United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172
(1989). Although the Court makes constant reference to the term "bedrock," it never really
defimes its meaning or parameters of operation. Judging from the context of its usage it may
be fairly said that the term is intended as a reference to well established foundational legal
principles. However, the absence of qualifying or limiting standards allows the Court to freely
choose which principles it wants to assign that label to. Although one may disagree with the
Court's determination in the cases discussed, that a particular principle is "bedrock," this
Article accepts the Court's determination for purposes of discussion, and focuses instead on
many deeply rooted concepts that the Court ignores or subjugates in its analysis.
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of civil rights plaintiffs. For example, it is fundamental to American
jurisprudence that if one's legally protected right is violated, the violator will be held responsible."' 0 This principle holds true, even if
there is no economic harm to the wronged party. In such cases, the
court may simply award injunctive or other limited relief."' Price
Waterhouse's holding that proven wrongdoing may still not provide a
basis for liability, departs from bedrock common law causation rules
for mixed-motive and concurrent cause cases. 8 In this area, courts
historically inquired whether the defendant's illegal conduct played a
role or was the dominant force in causing the harm; they did not
hypothesize what the defendant would have done absent the illegal
consideration. 3 Liability and relief in mixed-motive cases are also
well supported by the statute.' Moreover, "same decision" and
"harmless error" causation analysis falls short of Title VI's deterrence and compensation goals."8
The conclusion in Lorance that the statute of limitations for
discriminatory seniority policies begins to run when such policies are
adopted also contravenes the long established and widely accepted
"continuing violation" theory.1 86 Lorance also reflects a shift away

180. Prior to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), this principle had been
followed by some courts in civil rights cases. In promotion cases where the employer demonstrated that non-discriminatory reasons supported the denial of opportunity, courts still ,enjoined the unlawful portion of the employer's conduct and sometimes awarded plaintiff
attorney's fees. See Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985); King v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1984); Ostroff v. Employment Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d
302 (9th Cir. 1982); Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1981).
181. Nanty, 660 F.2d at 1333.
182. See generally Weber, supra note 48 (discussing mixed forces causation as it affects
liability in the common law context and juxtaposing that to the Court's approach in Price
Waterhouse; Professor Weber concludes that traditional common law rules, Title VII, and
legal theories generally, support the imposition of liability and the award of damages in
mixed-motive discrimination cases).
183. Id at 513-14.
184. Id. at 534-36. Imposing liability and awarding damages in mixed-motive cases also
advances the statute's deterrence function. Id. at 531-32.
185. See Belton, Burden-Shifting, supra note 46; Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of
Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 292 (1982) (discussing Title vl's legislative history and court precedents vis-a-vis
mixed-motive analysis, and proposing a causation theory measured against the statute's goals,
policy concerns, and the public interest).
186. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,
455 U.S. 363 (1982); Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974); Johnson v.
General Elec., 840 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1988); Cook v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 771
F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1985); Hall v. Ledex, Inc., 669 F.2d 397 (6th Cir. 1982); Jenkins v. Home
Ins. Co., 635 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1980); Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th
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from balanced, equitable, and humanitarian considerations previously
applied to determine how soon a claimant must begin asserting a
legal right." Wards Cove's adoption of the "usual methods of
proof"188 approach, which requires that plaintiff identify the wrong-

ful practice and show causation, departs from legislative intent, statutory precedents and fairness standards historically applied by courts
under similar circumstances. 89
Early in the development of American jurisprudence, courts recognized the difficulty innocent victims might have in obtaining evidence of wrongdoing. Rules, such as res ipsa loquitur, ° were de-

Cir. 1973).
187. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169-81 (1948). The equitable principles
outlined in Urie were applied by virtually every court in the country to preserve plaintiffs'
rights. See, e.g., Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230, 1238
(Cal. 1990) (interpreting insurance code's one-year statute of limitations provision triggered by
the inception of loss as intending to allow time for reasonable discovery of loss); see also
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 123-24 (1979) (holding that plaintiffs could recover
under the Federal Trade Commission Act even after the statute of limitations ran because the
statute is only triggered when a reasonably diligent claimant knows enough to protect himself); Callahan v. State, 464 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Iowa 1990) (interpreting Iowa's Tort Claims
Act, which bars claims two years after they occurred, as allowing plaintiff additional time to
discover injury).
The Court in Lorance relied on Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250
(1980), for the proposition that the first discriminatory act triggers the statute of limitations
provision, regardless of when the most painful effects are felt. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900, 906-08 (1989). Besides being factually distinguishable, Delaware State
College in large measure rests on the application of equitable standards since the employee
had knowledge and understood the implication of his denial of tenure. Because the Court's
interpretation is at odds with the remedial purposes of the statute, Justice Marshall noted,
"[t]his severe interpretation of § 706(e) will come as a surprise to Congress, whose
goals . . . never included conferring absolute immunity on discriminatorily adopted seniority
systems that survive their first 300 days." lId at 914 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
188. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657.
189. See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 178, at 72-77.
190. This doctrine, defined in BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990), as "the
thing speaks for itself," was used as early as 1614 in cases where usury was clear on the
face of an instrument. See Roberts v. Tremayne, 79 Eng. Rep. 433 (1614). It became regarded as a common-law doctrine of jurisprudence in Byrne v. Beadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299
(1863). As developed in Byrne, the rule shifted evidentiary burdens to the defendant after
plaintiff established a prima facie case by showing that the event occurred, minus evidence of
causation. See Stebel v. Connecticut Co., 96 A. 171 (Conn. 1915); see also JoHN H.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2509, at 498 (2d ed. 1923). The idea is that evidence of the true
cause of harm is accessible to defendant, not plaintiff, and therefore plaintiff should not
shoulder that burden. Like pre-Wards Cove disparate impact burden allocation, certain facts
warrant an inference of negligence and use of circumstantial evidence where direct evidence
is lacking. See Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233 (1913). The doctrine gives plaintiff a procedural advantage that is otherwise unavailable. See William L. Prosser, The Procedural Effect
of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1936) (arguing that the doctrine may create a
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veloped to accommodate plaintiffs, and were later expanded with doctrines such as enterprise liability, market share, and risk contribution
theories which shift causation, proof, and relief responsibilities to
defendants.19 Further, it is quite aberrational in Anglo-American jurisprudence for a court to impose a penalty that requires the culpable
party to adopt the correct behavior, which the innocent party is required to fashion.
Patterson's plain meaning approach to civil rights statutory construction, and reliance on stare decisis principles to uphold Runyon,
do violence to the text, context, and purpose of civil rights statutes
and well established construction principles. The Court's refusal in
Johnson to overrule Weber, exemplifies traditional stare decisis that is
minority-friendly."9 Wilks's imposition of mandatory intervention
rules, and Zipes's application of the American rule in determining fee
recovery, must overcome countervailing sensitivity to the rights of
discrimination victims. 9 3
permissible inference, presumption, or place the ultimate burden of proof on defendant); see
also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46 (1948) (arguing that application of the doctrine
warrants but does not compel an inference of negligence). The widespread use of this doctrine continues despite criticism. See John F. Thome I1, Comment, Mathematics, Fuzzy Negligence, and the Logic of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 147 (1980).
191. See Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 371-80 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (enterprise liability case shifting burden to show causation to defendants because of
plaintiff's inability to identify particular manufacturer); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924,
936-38 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (shifting burden of proof to defendants
to show that they could not have made the product that injured plaintiff); Collins v. Eli Lilly
Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 51-53 (Wis.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984) (adopting a "risk contribution" theory to impose all relief responsibilities on any one member of the potential class
of defendants causing the injury).
Legal scholarship has also provided substantial analytic support for expanded modes of
proof and recovery. For a critical discussion of this shift in legal thinking on causation,
burden allocation, and group liability over individual liability principles, see Robert A. Baruch
Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group Responsibility in the Law of
Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1473 (1986); Stephen A. Spitz, From Res Ipsa
Loquitur to Diethylstilbestrol: The Unidentifiable Tortfeasor in California, 65 IND. LJ. 591
(1990) (characterizing concert of action and alternative liability theories as enhanced res ipsa
loquitur).
Adjustments in traditional proof and recovery principles have also been made in the
area of toxic torts to respond to the idiosyncracies of that area. See Ora F. Harris, Jr., Toxic
Tort Litigation and the Causation Element: Is There Any Hope of Reconciliation?, 40 SW.
LJ. 909 (1986).
192. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361,
1409-14 (1988) (arguing that respect for Weber's integrity is grounded in traditional stare
decisis analysis, and rejecting Justice Scalia's contentions that Weber misinterpreted unambiguous statutory text, materially departed from prior Court decisions interpreting Title VII, and
converted the statute from an instrument of color-blindness to one of racism).
193. This sensitivity calls for uniformity and protection of "innocent" intervenors rights,'
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An initial reading of the latest employment decisions may give
the impression that the Court is moving its analysis of civil rights
employment laws to achieve coherence with mainstream Anglo-American jurisprudential rules governing liability and relief. However, these
decisions more accurately reflect an employer protective analytical
scheme, with statutory antidiscrimination goals subjugated to colorblind criteria. Principles of stare decisis which prevented the Court
from overruling Runyon may be too weak a restraint whenever a
conservative Court takes a second look at the holdings in United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber"s and Johnson v. Transportation
Agency.1 95 Justice O'Connor warned in Johnson that her stare decisis convictions were overwhelmed by Justice Scalia's statutory construction arguments."9 Fidelity to neutral principles and stare decisis
in Patterson, in order to avoid overruling Runyon v. McCrary,"97 is
devious because they were adopted with full recognition that § 1981
was left vulnerable. 98 Imposition of procedural rules in Wilks to
dismantle hard won gains cannot be easily reconciled with their contemporaneous use in Lorance to bar valid discrimination claims.

notwithstanding the fact that there is a significant distinction between an intervenor seeking to
prevent remediation, and one who is a civil rights advocate. See David Goldbergcr, First
Amendment Constraints on the Award of Attorney's Fees Against Civil Rights DefendantIntervenors: The Dilemma of the Innocent Volunteer, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 603, 624 (1986)
(arguing that the 16sing intervenor's right to advocacy justifies harm to plaintiff in the form
of increased litigation costs and delay in the exercise of a constitutional right); Brian Z.
Tamanaha, The Cost of Preserving Rights: Attorneys' Fee Awards and Intervenors in Civil
Rights Litigation, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 109, 130 (1984) (proposing a unified system

that puts intervenors on the same plane as plaintiffs).
194. 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding that Title VII permits voluntary affirmative action
plans that grant preferences to particular groups).
195.

480 U.S. 616 (1987) (holding that Title VII permits an employer to consider an

employee's sex in awarding a promotion).
196.
197.

See id at 647-56 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that § 1981 prohibits private schools from excluding

black students solely on the basis of race).
198. As Justice Brennan pointed out in Patterson, Justice Kennedy and other Justices that
constituted the majority, did not rule that Runyon was correctly decided and subsequently

ratified by Congress. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 189-219 (1989)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Daniel A. Farber, Statutory
Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2, 14-15 (1988)
(discussing the role and weight of public values in overruling statutory precedents in the civil
rights context; Professor Farber observed that societal values should be weighted favorably
and the justices who opposed the reconsideration of Runyon adhered to principles of judicial
candor by making it known that racial equality undergirded their position).
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D.

The Move Towards Textualism

The Court's interpretation of Title VII, as requiring that discrimination victims prove intent, dramatically curtailed the statute's reach,
and represented a continuing defeasance of victims' rights not commanded by statutory text. The text of Title VII does not specify an
intent requirement' The d.cision to saddle victims with motivebased responsibility evidenced a relapse into the discredited interpretive format used for Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes, that required state action in order for protection to accrue to black employees forced off their jobs by violence and threats.2"
The movement towards text-exclusive statutory construction creates the potential for further shrinking of statutory protection. Lately,
the Court has increasingly abandoned the use of and reliance on legislative history in construing statutes, and has primarily focused on
statutory text and context. 2 1 Unfortunately, Justice Scalia, the
Court's leading advocate of textualism, has been a nemesis of dis-

199. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; see also Owen M. Fiss, A Theory
of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CI. L. REV. 235, 296-300 (1971) (arguing that a requirement of intent violates the plain text of Title VIl). But see Lino A. Graglia, Racial Preferences, Quotas and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1117, 1125 (1992)
(arguing that § 706(g) of Title VII evidences the statute's design to prohibit only intentional
discrimination). Section 706(g) provides in relevant part: "If the court finds that the
respondent has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice . . . the court may
enjoin the respondent . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Under Professor Graglia's interpretation, the specific statutory language "because of," is trumped by enforcement options of a
court once intent is found. Recently, the Court rejected the' premiss of such an interpretation
by finding that a remedies provision in Title VII cannot surmount a specific statutory mandate. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 245 n.10 (1988). Moreover, the
statutory structure does not support such a construction. When Congress wanted to prohibit
only intentional discrimination, it specifically legislated such a requirement as evidenced by
the language dealing with seniority systems in § 703(h). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
200. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906) (holding that black employees were not
protected in their employment from a group of whites who ran them off their jobs using
violence, threats, and intimidation, because this was purely private action). Hodges was not
overruled until 1968. Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). For a discussion of
the evolution of the early civil rights statutes, their application in the employment area, and
the Court's destructive interpretations, see Barry L. Refsin, The Lost Clauses of Section 1981:
A Source of Greater Protection After Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1209 (1990); see also Michael Reiss, Requiem for an "Independent Remedy": The Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 as Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 50 S. CAL. L.
REV. 961 (1977).
201. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
Besides rejecting the use of extra-textual materials, this movement advocates greater reliance
on new canons of construction and interpretations of parallel statutory schemes.
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crimination victims. Even worse, textualism as espoused by Justice
Scalia is catching on in the Court.2' For this reason, the Court's
statutory construction opinions have become increasingly noteworthy.
1. Dichotomy Between Textualist Theory and Practice
In Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,20 3 the
Court applied plain meaning construction to Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure °4 to find its sanctions applicable only to
the attorney who signed court documents. 2° Writing for the Court,
Justice Scalia determined that Rule 11 imposed a duty on the signer
alone and therefore liability runs only to the signer, not his law firm
generally.2 6 Justice Scalia conceded that the language was susceptible to other interpretations, but concluded that the plain language and
its entire structure supported a narrow interpretation. Law firm acarguments did not persuade the Court to
countability and agency
207
reach a different result.
Another example of the Court's plain meaning bent can be found
in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County.2 8 In this case the Court applied
plain meaning construction to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"), 209 although it produced an absurd result. Under the RCRA, citizens are prohibited from bringing a lawsuit
prior to the expiration of sixty days after notice to the defendant.210
Using literal construction, the Court found that the sixty-day notice
requirement was an absolute precondition to suit and therefore a sixty-day stay by a court after suit was filed could not be substituted.21 ' Although the purpose of the notice provisions was essentially
satisfied by the sixty-day stay, and the litigation had already run its
course, the Court ruled that the statute's clear text compelled dismissal.

2 12

The application of plain meaning construction and textualism
generally to employment antidiscrimination statutes has led to particu-

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
493 U.S. 120 (1989).
FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
Pavelic, 493 U.S. at 123-24.
Id. at 124.
Id at 126.
493 U.S. 20 (1989).
42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988).
Id § 6972(b)(1)(A)(ii).
HaUstrom, 493 U.S. at 26.
Id at 31-33.
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larly harsh results. Take for example the Zipes opinion which Justice
Scalia authored. The language at issue was the fee-shifting provision
of section 706(k) which provided, in relevant part, that a "court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs ... ."3 None of these words appears to be
ambiguous. Taken as a whole, they also make grammatical sense. The
instruction to a reviewing court is clear. In everyday usage, "may" is
commonly used and understood as a grant of permission. It is also
defimed that way in the dictionary," 4 and has the same meaning in
legal parlance. The same is true of the use and understanding of the
phrase "prevailing party" in the legal context. It is generally understood to mean the winner of particular issues or the overall litigation.
Justice Scalia found that the language in section 706(k) was not
plain. Keep in mind that as a textualist, he uses a broad definition of
plain21 5 and had remarked on at least one occasion that Title VII
was a model in statutory draftsmanship.2 6 By determining that the
language was not plain, Justice Scalia was able to trump the text with
judicial canons of construction. To buttress his interpretation he relied
on the American rule that winners are not usually entitled to fees
from losers, and the principle that fee liability and merits liability run
together.21 7 Additionally, he cited case law for the proposition that a
losing party's interests may sometimes take precedence over those of
a prevailing party, and supplied his own assessment that the text did
2t
not say that the prevailing party's interest is first and foremost.
Undaunted, he worked further destruction to the text by inverting
the permission evidenced by the word "may" and converting it to
"may not," thereby disregarding congressional hostility to categorical
rules in the fee shifting area.219 Justice S
Scalia continued his interpretation "in light
of
the
competing
equities
that Congress normally takes
into account" ° arguing that his interpretation served "congressional
213. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(k).
214. THE NEW YORK TIMES EVERYDAY DICTIONARY 424 (1982).
215. See, e.g., Unites States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-45 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that text may be plain without having specific language on the issue).
216. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger made the same observation about Title VII in United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 216 (1979) (Burger, C., dissenting).
217. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758-59 (1989).
218. Id at 760 (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), for
the proposition that conceded statutory goals must compete with other considerations to
determine what the statute means).
219. See id at 771 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
220. Id at 761. The reference to matters that Congress typically considers is a bitter
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policy in favor of 'vigorous' adversary proceedings." 22 He concluded that his interpretation did not contravene Congress' goals because
the losing party in this case did not violate the law.2'
Not only did Justice Scalia substitute his personal judgment for
that of plain text in Zipes, but his assessment of congressional goals
was not grounded in any specific evidence. Extensive legislative history established that Congress made a clear conferral of discretion on
district court judges, with the objective of making discrimination victims whole.22 Congress ranked plaintiffs highest in the fee recovery
scheme, and provided them with a source of fees to facilitate vindication of their rights. 4 Justice Scalia placed intervenors on a par
with plaintiffs, although he was aware that intervenors essentially
function as plaintiffs' adversaries in Title VII proceedings.
In Lorance, Justice Scalia rejected "a plausible, and perhaps even
the most natural, reading of § 703(h) ',22 of Title VII, in favor of
Court precedent. The Court was also called upon to interpret the statute of limitations provisions of section 706(e), which required plaintiffs to file a charge within 180 or 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 6 Because the policy at issue
was fair in form, employees had no clue as to its potential future
consequences. The Court was asked to determine when the wrongful
practice "occurred" in view of the policy's facial neutrality.
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia did not find that the text
was plain, because the provision is obviously not self-actuating, and

irony because Justice Scalia is unwilling to rely on information coming directly from Congress. His ability to discern what the entire Congress normally considers is questionable, and
his willingness to utilize factors that went into the enactment of the statute raises questions
of judicial policymaking he so vigorously cautions against.
221. Id at 766 (quoting Christiansburg Garment, 434 U.S. at 419).
222. See id at 761-64. Flagrant disregard of congressional goals appears to be a greater
abdication of judicial responsibility than reliance on legislative history to achieve congressional goals that plain text controverts.
223. See Id at 772 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
224. Justice Marshall argued in his dissent:
While the majority pays lipservice to the objectives of Title VII, it is guilty of
establishing its own "judge-made ranking of rights." By elevating intervenors to the
same plane as Title VII plaintiffs, the majority undermines Congress' determination
that Title VII plaintiffs alone are "the chosen instruments" for vindicating the national policy against discrimination.
Id at 774 n.3 (citation omitted); see also id at 776 n.4 (stating that "[b]y contrast, several
fee-shifting statutes outside the civil rights field specify that attorney's fees are available only
upon a showing of injury in violation of the underlying statute").
225. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900, 908 (1989).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
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when an unlawful employment practice actually occurs can vary with
the circumstances. Justice Scalia conceded that his task required a
value judgment" 7 He phrased the competing interests in neutral legal terms as a balance between the rationales for allowing valid
claims and barring stale ones.2 8 In simple terms this boiled down
to weighing the interest of employees to be free from discrimination,
and the interest of employers to be free from the sanctions of
antidiscrimination laws in a time certain, after a wrongful act is committed. Justice Scalia interpreted section 706(e) to mean that the statute begins to run from the time the policy is "adopted,"2 9 even
though employees may not be aware, affected, or harmed at that time.
As his interpretive guide, he used the NLRA and case law interpreting that statute, because of the NLRA's substantive similarities to
Title VII. Justice Scalia concluded that the context of the two statutes
supported this approach. Completely brushed aside was the plain legal
interpretive potential of "occurrence" evidenced by the continuing
violation theory developed and accepted by courts.
In Patterson, the Court was called upon to interpret § 1981,
which provides:
All persons within the Jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions, of every
kind, and to no other."'
At issue in Patterson was whether § 1981's making and enforcing
antidiscrimination mandate protected on-the-job discrimination.23 x
The drafters of § 1981 obviously did not pull a coup in assembling this language. Nonetheless, the Court found that the language
was plain. 2 It adopted a construction that "make" means "form,"
and therefore only policed discriminatory refusals to contract or offers
to contract on discriminatory terms. It then determined that "enforce"

227. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 911 (quoting Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,
260 (1980)).
228. Id (citing Delaware State College, 449 U.S. at 260).
229. Id at 912 n.5.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
231. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1989).
232. 1&. at 176-77.
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means "redress," and therefore only policed a discriminatory bar to
legal processes.1 3 Further, the Court found that neither semantics
nor logic supported a different interpretation.2
Readers of § 1981 will likely be surprised to learn that the statute is so clear. The text does not say make "employment" contracts,
and the words "sue," "be parties," and "give evidence" that come
after "enforcement" may logically be read as additional rights, as
opposed to a description of enforcement rights. The remainder of the
text is even more cloudy. The Court's finding that the text is plain is
therefore quite curious.
Other issues of construction had to be resolved in Patterson. It
was clear to the Court that there was some overlap between § 1981
and Title VII. To resolve the overlap issue, the Court utilized its own
canon that the earlier statute (§ 1981) should not be read broadly
when this would circumvent the detailed remedial scheme of a later
statute (Title VI).25 This canon was chosen over the more recognized canon that when statutes overlap, a court is "not at liberty 'to
infer any positive preference for one over the other.' 236 Nonetheless, the Court decided that its construction made the two statutory
schemes coherent, and settled for an interpretation
that concededly
237
frustrated the congressional objectives of Title VI.
The textualists in Patterson infused meaning from the air,
avoiding compelling canons of construction in their apparent quest to
limit employees' civil rights. To achieve this goal the Court had to
reject the construction that "make" arguably covers postformation
conduct by the employer "that demonstrates that the contract was not
really made on equal terms at all."2 31 The Court also had to sidestep expansive legislative history which documented that an amendment to Title VII which would have foreclosed the use of § 1981 to
remedy employment discrimination claims was rejected, and Congress
specifically noted that the two statutes protected similar rights although detailing different prerequisites for filing.239

233. Id at 177-78.
234. Id at 178.
235. See id at 181-82.
236. Id (quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975)).
237. See id at 174 ('After examining the point with care, however, we believe that a
sound construction of the language of § 1981 yields an interpretation which does not frustrate
congressional objectives in Title VII to any significant degree.").
238. Id at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
239. Id at 189-213 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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2. Defects of Textualism
The ideological and practical defects of textualism are well documented.' 4 Moreover, Congress has consistently rejected pinched
textualist construction of civil rights statutes.241 As a result, insistence on plain meaning construction despite repeated congressional
guidance in this area verges on the subversive. The Court has not
articulated a credible reason or proposed a legitimate theory for abandoning deep-rooted consideration of and reliance on legislative history
as contextual data. Add to this the flaws of textualism, and the importance of broad construction that includes sensitizing considerations
such as the statute's historical and legislative context, and the Court's
error becomes magnified.
To maintain credibility, the Court must at the very least, apply
bedrock principles and textualist construction honestly and consistently, to the extent they are legitimate. Only by withstanding well-founded claims that its methodology is designed to promote a hidden agenda242 can the Court reduce the costs and acrimony associated with
securing congressional declarations overruling its interpretations.24 3
Legislative history, context, and goals have historically been core
considerations for judges interpreting statutes. Despite potential for

240. See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr., supra note 201, at 670-78, 683-84 (concluding that avoidance of legislative history is not constitutionally mandated as the textualists argue, and noting
that less judicial substitution of judgment for that of Congress is not a proven accomplishment of the new textualism; Professor Eskridge also recognized the potential for abuse of
textualism to undo Congress' work); see also Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the
Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. CoLO. L. REv. 37, 55-63 (1991) (outlining the
scholars' main criticisms of textualism); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Statutes: Towards a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA.
L. REV. 1295, 1310 (1990) (highlighting that there is no empirical evidence that the mutual
assent of Congress and the President to statutory text yields awareness of the precise meaning
of the statutory language).
241. See Greenberger, supra note 240, at 37-51 (discussing the many civil rights decisions that Congress was forced to overrule within the last twenty years).
242. See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L.
REV. 277, 308-09 (1990) (pointing out that the textualist methodology is executive-enhancing,
and emphasizing the role of context and legislative history in statutory interpretation); see
also Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 399
(contending that text-focused analysis is a convenient tool of Republican judges seeking to
defer to executive actions and regulations).
243. See Farber, supra note 198, at 13 (amending a statute to reinstate previous interpretation involves social costs, commitment of legislative resources, and opportunity costs for
other issues); see also Charles S. Ralston, Court vs. Congress: Judicial Interpretation of the
Civil Rights Acts and Congressional Response, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 205 (1990).
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abuse, these considerations have proven their value as interpretive
guides and should not be abandoned, particularly when their replacement is ideologically and practically inferior. Desires for clarity and
uniformity in this area should not come with a heavy price tag for
remedial schemes which attempt to account for the nation's legacy of
discrimination. Harm suffered from historical or societal discrimination, concededly wrongful and injurious,2 should play some role in
employment remedial schemes. Societal discrimination and other historical wrongs should not fall in the category of "stale" claims, ineligible for consideration, or insufficient to form a basis for relief.245
Despite modest gains in recent years, minorities still need
antidiscrimination laws that respond to the changing nature of employment discrimination, and accommodate employees' paucity of
direct evidence of bias.
]I.

A.

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

The 1990 and 1991 Civil Rights Acts

Congress responded to the flurry of employment decisions narrowing employee protection against discrimination. The Civil Rights
Act of 199W24 was introduced and subsequently approved by both
houses of Congress. However, it was vetoed2 47 by President Bush,
who labeled the legislation a quota bill. 248 Sufficient congressional
249
support could not be garnered to override the President's veto.

The Democrats and the civil rights community regrouped, and at the
beginning of the next congressional session, they introduced House
Bill 1, 250 titled the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 Act").2 51 In

direct response to the President's concerns about quotas, House Bill 1

244. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 188 (1989) ("The law now
reflects society's consensus that discrimination based on the color of one's skin is a profound
wrong of tragic dimension."); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.

469, 527

(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is plainly true that in our society blacks have suffered
discrimination immeasurably greater than any directed at other racial groups.").
245. The irony is that societal discrimination, which provided the foundation for racial
advantage, is now an insufficient foundation for racial remediation.
246. H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
247. 136 CoNG. REc. S16,562 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
248. Id
249. In the Senate, the bill, S2104, passed with a vote of 65 to 34, 136 CONG. REC.
S9966 (daily ed. July 18, 1990). In the House, the vote for H.R. 4000 was 272 to 154 in
fivor of the bill. 136 CONG. REC. H6769 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990).
250. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).

251. Id
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expressly provided that quotas be neither required nor encouraged.252 Despite this provision, President Bush still contended that
the legislation was a quota bill and introduced his own legislation,
House Bill 1375. 25
Believing that neither House Bill 1 nor the Bush
Administration's ("Administration") bill could attract sufficient votes
for passage or an ultimate veto override, several "substitute" bills or
amendments were offered by other legislators. As a compromise to
House Bill 1, the Brooks-Fish Amendment or Bipartisan Substitute, 2 4 was offered. The Michel Amendmente 55 was offered as a
substitute for the Administration bill, and another substitute bill referred to as the Towns-Schroeder Bill 6 was proposed. The TownsSchroeder Bill and the Michel Amendment were defeated in the
House,5 7 and the Bipartisan Substitute survived, but without enough
votes to override a veto. 258 The Brooks-Fish Amendment then went
to the Senate,259 where Senator Danforth responded by introducing
more narrow legislation, 26 which initially ran into opposition from
the White House. 26' However, after extensive negotiations and compromise, 26 the Danforth proposal passed the Senate by an over-

252. Id § 13.
253. H.R. 1375, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
254. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Brooks-Fish Amendment] (not
named Brooks-Fish Amendment until 137 CONG. REC. H3928 (daily ed. June 5 (1991)).
255. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
256. Id (not called Towns-Schroeder Bill until 137 CONG. RFE. H3883 (daily ed. June 4,
1991)).
257. 137 CONG. REC. H3896, H3908 (daily ed. June 4, 1991).
258. Id at H3958 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (the vote was 264 to 166).
259. Id at S9265 (daily ed. July 8, 1991).
260. S. 1745, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
261. The White House also rejected Senator Danforth's legislation, calling it a quota bill.
In response, Senator Danforth contended that the President's concerns about quotas were
pretextual and designed to preserve the quota issue for election purposes, since quotas are so
unpopular with the American public. See Charles Gren, GOP Senator Blasts Bush on Civil
Rights Bill, MMU HERALD, Sept. 26, 1991, at A7.
262. Over a dozen separate amendments were proposed prior to the bill's passage in the
Senate. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S15,446 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (amendment No. 1290
to No. 1287 offered by Senator Rudman); id at S15,451 (amendment No. 1291 to No. 1287
offered by Senators Nickles and Specter); i at S15,458 (amendment No. 1292 to No. 1287
offered by Senators Warner, Mikuski, Stevens, Robb, Wirth, Kennedy, Sarbanes, and Adams);
id at S15,461 (amendment No. 1293 to No. 1287 offered by Senator McCain); id at
S15,471 (amendment No. 1294 to No. 1287 offered by Senators Hatch, Jeffords, Mitchell,
and Dole); 1i at S15,471 (amendment No. 1295 to No. 1287 offered by Senators Hatch,
Kennedy, and Danforth); id at S15,500) (amendment No. 1296 to No. 1287 offered by
Senators Hatch and Dole); i1 at S15,501 (amendment No. 1297 to No. 1287 offered by
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whelming majority.2 The legislation was then sent to the House,
where it received overwhelming support, except for minor amendments, and passed easily. 2" The President subsequently signed this
legislation titled the Civil Rights Act of 1991.265 This law effectively reversed most of the above-noted cases, but some standards enunciated by the Court were left intact. Further, several key issues such as
affirmative action ' and retroactivity2 7 were left unanswered, and
require critical examination. Moreover, a strengthened, ideologically
conservative Supreme Court charged with interpreting the new legislation, requires close scrutiny.
1. Adjusting Causation and Liability Rules
House Bill 1 adopted the employee's proposal in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins by providing for a violation any time an impermissible consideration contributed to the employer's decision. 268 Proof
that the employer would have made the same decision for legitimate
reasons would therefore only affect the remedy, not liability.269 The
bipartisan bill provided for a violation whenever an impermissible
consideration was a "motivating factor," even if other legitimate considerations played a role.2 This approach was less attractive to
plaintiffs than House Bill 1, but more advantageous than the
Administration's bill which did not deal with this issue, thereby leaving Price Waterhouse standards intact. The bipartisan bill also allowed for damages to the extent injury could be traced to the wrongfil conduct.2
The new Civil Rights Act confirms the Price Waterhouse standards by providing for a violation whenever a prohibited consideration was a "motivating factor" in making a decision. 21 This
change reflects a partial gain for employment discrimination plaintiffs

Senators Hatch and Mitchell).
263. Id. at S15,501 (amendment No. 1274-the amendment in the nature of a substitute,
as amended-was agreed to). The bill, S. 1745, was passed by a vote of 93 to 5. Id. at
S15,503.
264. 137 CONG. REC. H9557 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (the vote was 381 to 38).
265. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub, L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
266. See infra notes 344-424 and accompanying text.
267. See infra notes 337-43 and accompanying text.
268. H.R. 1, § 5(a).
269. See id
270. Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 103(a).
271. Id § 103(b).
272. § 107, 105 Stat. at 1075-76.
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who would have been better off with language such as "contributing
factor," or better, "any role." The new language should deter employers from relying on impermissible considerations in making adverse
decisions since it allows courts to grant some relief even if the employer demonstrates that it would have made the same decision absent
reliance on the impermissible factor. However, an employee's remedies are limited.'
2. Expanding the Statute of Limitations
To deal with the time of adoption approach spelled out in
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, House Bill 1 and the bipartisan bill
provided that the statute of limitations would begin to run from the
time the unlawful practice occurred or adversely affected an employee. 274 These bills also sought to extend the statute of limitations to
two years and 540 days respectively.27 The Administration's proposal provided for a violation when the seniority system was adopted,
when an employee became subject to it, or when an employee was
injured by its application.276 This proposal also required that the
plaintiff show that the seniority system was motivated by an intent to
discriminate. 2' Further, the Administration's proposal left the existing statute of limitations periods intact by omitting any provision on
this issue.
The 1991 Act changes Lorance's time of adoption approach by
providing that the limitations period begins to run from the time of
adoption, when an employee becomes subject to it, or at the time of
injury." The seniority system must also have been adopted for in-

273. Section 107(b) amends § 706(g) to read as follows:
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 703(m)
and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same
action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in
clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 703(m); and

(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission,
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
274. H.R. 1, § 7; Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 105. This approach was
intended to reverse United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).

275. H.R. 1, § 7; Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 105.
276. H.R. 1375, § 7.
277. Id
278. § 112, 105 Star. at 1078-79. This section provides:
[A]n unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to a seniority system that
has been adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose in violation of this
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tentionally discriminatory purposes to violate the 1991 Act.279 These
standards are essentially what the Bush Administration had proposed.
Although the new law broadens the limitations period, it saddles employees with motive-based standards that are tough to satisfy. This
means that employees will no longer have to be clairvoyant when a
policy fair in form is instituted; however, finding the smoking gun to
enforce statutory rights will be difficult.
3. Restoring Griggs
In response to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, House Bill 1
and the bipartisan bill included specific provisions designed to overrule Wards Cove and codify Griggs v. Duke Power Co.28 ° These
provisions were intended to return proof standards in impact cases to
their pre-Wards Cove condition. As such, once plaintiff demonstrated
disparate impact, the employer would be required to prove business
necessity to avoid liability. There seemed to have been consensus
between the competing bills that business necessity ought to be the
controlling standard.2"' However, there was a parting of ways on
the definition of business necessity.2 s To address Wards Cove's requirement that the specific practice be isolated, the Brooks-Fish
Amendment further provided that plaintiff may be excused from identifying the specific practices if a court determined that a specific
practice cannot be identified.28 Further, a practice required by busi-

title (whether or not that discriminatory purpose is apparent on the face of the
seniority provision), when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual
becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by
the application of the seniority system or provision of the system.
279. Id
280. 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also H.RL 1, § 3; Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note
254, § 101.
281. H.R. 1375, § 4, also requires employers to show business necessity, as did other
bills introduced and defeated. See 137 CONG. REC. S15,316-19 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991)
(remarks of Sen. Hatch).
282. H.R. I defined business necessity as "a significant relationship to successful performance of the job," H.R. 1, § 3(o)(1), while the bipartisan bill's standard was "a significant

and manifest relationship to the requirements for effective job performance," Brooks-Fish
Amendment, supra note 254, § 101. The Administration's bill required that the "practice has
a manifest relationship to the employment in question or that the respondent's legitimate
employment goals are significantly served by, even if they do not require, the challenged
practice." H.R 1375, § 3(n).
283. Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 102. H.R. 1375, on the other hand,
required that the plaintiff identify the particular challenged employment practice. It further absolved the employer of liability unless it refused to adopt an alternative shown by plaintiff to
be comparable in cost and effectiveness in predicting job performance or achieving the
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ness necessity is still unlawful if the plaintiff shows that2 4another
practice with less disparate impact serves the employer well.
28 5
The new law confirmed statutory authority for impact claims.
Further, it retained the consensus that business necessity ought to be
the governing standard, and shifted this burden back to the employer,
thereby codifying Griggs."s In addition to a specific statement that
Griggs is codified, the Act stated that its particular purpose is to re28 7
turn the business necessity analysis to pre-Wards Cove status.
Moreover, Congress employed the unusual strategy of setting aside
"exclusive" legislative history on this subject to combat competing
views about the employer's burden.8 8
To obtain bipartisan support and presidential approval, the Act
left some Wards Cove requirements intact. To dispel concerns about
quotas, the 1991 Act requires that a complaining party either identify
the specific wrongful practice or show the court that the employer's
decisionmaking process cannot be broken down into separate identifiable practices. 2 9 This standard is a bit tougher than the bipartisan
proposal, which excused the plaintiff if the specific practice could not

employer's goals. H.R. 1375, § 4.
284. Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 102.
285. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071.
286. § 105, 105 Stat. at 1074.
287. § 3(2), 105 Stat. at 1071. However, § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074, amends § 703 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by adding subsection (k)(1)(A) which sets out the employer's
burden as "consistent with business necessity," not "required by business necessity" as developed under Griggs. The word "consistent" can be fairly regarded as creating a lighter burden
than previously established by the word "required."
288. Section 105(b), 105 Stat. at 1075, which provides:
No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative
history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to Wards Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.
289. Section 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074, amends § 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
read as follows:
(B)Ci) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a
disparate impact... the complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular
challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent's
decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the
decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.
The requirement that plaintiff identify each practice with specificity responded to
concerns that employers would be forced to adopt quotas if plaintiffs were allowed to simply
point to an imbalance in the workforce to establish a violation.
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be identified.2 9 Wards Cove's requirement that causation be shown
was generally retained as a prerequisite for impact plaintiffs in the
new law.2 9' Moreover, even if plaintiff overcomes each requirement,
relief is essentially limited to the employer's adoption of plaintiff's
proposed alternative. 2n
4. Expanding § 1981
Both House Bill 1 and the bipartisan bill responded to Patterson
by providing that the right to make and enforce contracts included the
making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and
the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of contractual relationships. 293 This approach worked an effective reversal
of Patterson and emerged as an agreeable approach for the President.
The new law.prohibits post-hiring discrimination by providing a broad
definition of the phrase "make and enforce."2 4 Besides effectively
reversing Patterson, the 1991 Act eliminates doubts about whether §
1981 applies to private discrimination, thereby removing Runyon from
its vulnerable stare decisis pedestal.29 5 The § 1981 amendments
therefore represent firm gains for discrimination victims.
5. Protecting Consent Decrees
To address Wilks, House Bill 1 and the bipartisan bill bound
individuals with notice of a proposed judgment and opportunity to
object before its entry.2 9 In instances where reasonable efforts were
made to provide notice to interested individuals, future challenges
were also precluded.2" Further, individuals whose interests were
adequately represented by a party in the lawsuit were also bound by
the judgment.2 9 The Administration's proposal was silent on consent decrees, thereby leaving Wilks's standards in place.
290. Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 102.
291. See generally § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074.
292. Id
293. H.R. 1, § 12; Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 110.
294. Section 101, 105 Stat. at 1071-72, which adds subsection (b) to 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
providing: "For purposes of this section, the term 'make and enforce contracts' includes the
making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship."
295. Id Section 101 also adds subsection (c) to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which provides: "The
rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law."
296. H.R. 1, § 6; Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 104.
297. H.R. 1, § 6.
298. Id
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Gains were made in this area for plaintiffs in the 1991 Act,
which limits third party challenges to consent decrees in some respects.299 The legislation sets out a requirement of "actual" notice to
interested parties who may be adversely affected, plus a reasonable
opportunity to present objections. It also precludes challenges when
interested parties' interests are fairly represented by direct parties."°
Plaintiffs are therefore relieved of mandatory joinder obligations imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 The new law sets
out standards that, if met by plaintiffs, will generally protect the integrity of consent decrees.
6. Leaving Zipes Intact
Due to the chilling potential of Zipes, a provision was inserted in
House Bill 1 and the bipartisan bill to allow the recovery of attorney
fees from unsuccessful intervenors."re Further, using a standard of
fairness, the bills also allowed for recovery from the original party
against whom relief was granted, or based on an equitable allocation.0 3 The bipartisan bill also provided for expert fees, litigation
expenses, voluntary fee waivers or negotiations, and prohibited coerced waivers. °' The Administration's proposal capped expert fees

299. Section 108, 105 Stat. at 1076, adds new subsection (n)(1)(B) to § 703 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and provides:
A practice described in subparagraph (A) may not be challenged in a claim under
the Constitution or Federal civil rights laws(i) by a person who, prior to the entry of the judgment or order described in
subparagraph (A), had(1)actual notice of the proposed judgment or order sufficient to apprise
such person that such judgment or order might adversely affect the interests and
legal rights of such person and that an opportunity was available to present objections to such judgment or order by a future date certain; and
(E) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judgment or
order, or
(ii) by a person whose interests were adequately represented by another person
who had previously challenged the judgment or order on the same legal grounds
and with a similar factual situation, unless there has been an intervening change in
law or fact.
300. Id
301. L However, subsection (n)(1)(B) further provides: "(2) Nothing in this subsection
shall be construed to(A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or apply to the rights of parties who have successfully intervened pursuant to such
rule in the proceeding in which the parties intervened."
302. See H.R. 1, § 9; Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 107.
303. See H.R. 1, § 9; Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 107.
304. Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 107.
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305
at $300 per day as part of the prevailing party's costs.
The new law has a provision for expert fees but does not specifically address the losing intervenor holding of Zipes. ° As a result,
Court standards outlined in Zipes remain controlling.

B.

Additional Legislative Proposalsand Changes

Additional provisions designed to restore, and in some instances
broaden Title VII's scope included House Bill 1 and the bipartisan
bill that civil rights laws be broadly construed; 7 provisions for jury
trials;'
unlimited compensatory damages in cases of intentional
discrimination;" punitive damages in cases of malicious, reckless
or indifferent conduct;31 0 retroactivity for all approved changes in
Title VII to the dates of the cases they impact;
a prohibition of
3
1
"race norming"; 1 the extension of Title VII's coverage to Congress;3 13 making statute of limitations under the ADEA and Title
VII uniform; 314 extraterritorial application of Title VII; 3 5 a provision for expert fees for plaintiffs; 3"6 and another for the recovery of
305. See H.R. 1375, § 9.
306. See §§ 103, 113, 105 Stat. at 1074, 1079, dealing with the issue of attorney's fees
generally. Section 113(b) amends § 706(k) of Title VII to allow courts to include expert fees
as part of attorney's fee awards.
307. H.R. 1, § 11; Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 109.
308. H.R. 1, § 8; Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 106.
309. H.R. 1, § 8.
310. L In the bipartisan bill, a cap of $150,000 was set for punitive damage awards, or
an amount equal to compensatory damages plus equitable relief, whichever is greater. BrooksFish Amendment, supra note 254, § 106(b).
311. H.R. 1, § 15; Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 113.
312. Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 116. "Race norming" refers to the
practice of adjusting employment test scores on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. See, e.g., Baynes v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 976 F.2d 1370, 1375 n.5 (lth
Cir. 1992); Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225, 228 (7th Cir. 1992).
313. H.R. 1, § 16; Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 114.
314. H.R. 1, § 17; Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 117.
315. Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 119. This provision was intended to
reverse EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991), which held that Title VII
does not cover American citizens employed overseas by American companies.
316. Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 107. In West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v.
Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991), the Court held that fees paid by a prevailing party to experts
assisting with case preparation were not recoverable as reasonable attorney's fees. Using his
brand of textualist statutory construction, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, compared the
text of fee shifting provisions in civil rights laws with the text of other federal fee shifting
statutes. He determined that expert fees and attorney fees are treated as separate items in
statutory construction, and Congress had specifically limited fees for experts to $30 per day
for witnesses. Rejecting a construction "grounded in the remedial purpose" of the statute,
Justice Scalia concluded that where statutory language is unambiguous, the Court's only role
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interest against the federal government.317

The Administration's proposal was silent on the statute's construction regarding jury trials;3 1

did not provide for punitive dam-

ages, but allowed for "equitable" relief in harassment cases; 319 provided for neither retroactivity 320 nor extraterritoriality; 321 was silent
on race norming; and included an amendment that extended the
statute's coverage to Congress. 32
The new law does not contain a "broad construction" clause, 32

but amends Title VII to provide for compensatory damages in cases
of intentional discrimination. 24 It also provides for punitive damages for malicious and reckless conduct. 3' However, these damage
awards have caps, depending upon the employer's size.326 Provisions
for jury trials are included; 327 race norming is prohibited;3 21 cover-

is to enforce its terms. See also Crawford Fitting Co. v. Gibbons, 482 U.S. 437 (1987)
(offering similarly narrow construction of fees provision).
317. Brooks-Fish Amendment, supra note 254, § 108. This provision was designed to
overturn Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986), which held that § 706(k) of
Title VII only waived federal government immunity with respect to attorney's fees, not
interest.
318. See generally H.R. 1375.
319. Id § 8. A cap of $150,000 is placed on this provision, and the award must be
justified by the equities, statutory purpose, and public interest. Id
320. See id § 14.
321. See generally id
322. l § 11.
323. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(1991).
324. Id § 102, 105 Stat. at 1072. Compensatory damages had traditionally been available
only under § 1981, and were limited to race and ethmicity discrimination. The 1991 Act
broadens Title VI's compensatory damages relief coverage to include disability discrimination.
Il Section 102 adds subsection (a)(2) to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. By including disability in its
scope of coverage, the 1991 Act supplants the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), which did not provide for compensatory damages.
325. § 102, 105 Stat. at 1072. Section 102 adds subsection (b)(1) to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
326. Section 102 adds subsection (b)(3) to 42 U.S.C § 1981. Caps under the new law
may result in employer reliance on Title VII when defending against plaintiffs eligible under
§ 1981 and Title VII who allege violations of both laws. For example, a black woman
alleging race discrimination under both statutes might trigger a defense that plaintiffs harm,
if proven, is traceable to sex discrimination (subject to damage caps under Title VII), as
opposed to race discrimination (not subject to caps under § 1981).
327. See id Section 102 adds subsection (c) to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Jury trials had
essentially been available only to employees covered by § 1981. However, Title VII plaintiffs
alleging sex, religion, or national origin discrimination did not get a trial by jury. Additionally, public sector employees were not entitled to jury trials because of their exclusion from
§ 1981 coverage. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (noting that §
1981 does not provide an independent federal damages remedy for racial discrimination by
local governmental entities because Congress intended that § 1983 remedies control in actions
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age is extended to Congress,329 previously exempted state employees, 330 and American employees abroad; 331 and some recovery is

provided for expert fees paid by plaintiffs for case preparation. 32

against state actors). The 1991 Act gives a trial by jury right to both private and public
sector employees. § 102(c), 105 Stat. at 1073.
328. Section 106, 105 Stat. at 1075, provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in connection with
the selection or referral of applicants or candidates for employment or promotion,
to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results
of, employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin.
329. Id § 117, 105 Stat. at 1080. Senate employees, presidential appointees not subject
to Senate confirmation, and previously exempted staff of elected officials are now covered.
House employees are not covered, but can utilize internal House rules and processes. Senate
employees can file their claims with the office of fair employment practices, presided over by
appointed officials. See Government Employees Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 303,
105 Stat. 1088 (1991). Jury trials and punitive damages are unavailable, but appeals to the
Federal Courts of Appeals are permissible. Id § 309(a). Presidential appointees and staff of
elected officials can go to the EEOC, with rights of review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. Id §§ 320, 321. Final responsibility for relief lies with the President and
Senators. Id § 323.
330. § 321, 105 Stat. at 1088. Under Title VII certain elected and appointed officials
were exempted. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(f). This definitional section provides:
The term 'employee' . . . shall not include any person elected to public office in
any State or political subdivision of any State by qualified voters thereof, or any
person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise
of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the
preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of
a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision.
The new Act does not eliminate this exemption, but expands coverage to non-elected
officials by providing:
The rights, protections, and remedies provided pursuant to section 302 and 307(h)
of this Title shall apply with respect to employment of any individual chosen or
appointed, by a person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision
of any State by the qualified voters thereof(1) to be a member of the elected official's personal staff;
(2) to serve the elected official on a policymaking level; or
(3) to serve the elected official as an immediate advisor with respect to the
exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.
§ 321(a), 105 Stat. at 1097. Appointed state judges, therefore, are now covered. See Gregory
v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2403-04 (1991) (holding that appointed state judges fall within
the exemption created for certain "employees" under § 630(f) of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (which is the same as § 2000e of the Civil Rights Act of 1991)).
331. § 109, 105 Stat. at 1077. This section essentially overrules EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 111 S. CL 1227 (1991) (holding that Title VII does not apply extraterritorially to
regulate employment practices of U.S. employers who employ U.S. citizens abroad).
332. § 113, 105 Stat. at 1079. Title VII, § 1981, and § 1981(a) plaintiffs are eligible,
and to this extent, the holding in West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138
(1991) (holding that fees for services rendered by experts in civil rights litigation could not
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Interest is also now recoverable against the federal government.333
The 1991 Act contains a general statement that it takes effect
upon enactment, but does not deal specifically with post-Act claims
*based on pre-Act conduct.3" However, it curiously carves out the
sections on extraterritorial application335 and disparate impact cases
filed before March 1, 1975, and initially decided after October 30,
1983, from retroactive application. 3 6 Because the Act's structure is
conflicting, retroactivity has assumed a leading role in employment
discrimination lawsuits.
II. THE RETRoAcrivrrY DISPUTE
Despite its many provisions clearly strengthening or expanding
employment discrimination laws, the new Civil Rights Act does not
address when it takes effect in an unassailable way. As a result, retroactivity has already become a contentious issue. The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law construes the 1991 Act as applying retroactively because of the carved out exceptions to retroactivity.337 However, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

be shifted to losing party), is overruled.
333. § 114, 105 Stat. at 1079. This section works a reversal of Library of Congress v.
Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986) (holding government liable for costs, exclusive of interest), and
also extended the period for filing from 30 to 90 days. Id.
334. § 402(a), 105 Stat. at 1099.
335. Id. Section 109(b), 105 Stat. at 1077, adds subsection (c) to § 702 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
336. Id § 402(b), 105 Stat. at 1099. This provision exempts the defendants in Wards
Cove from coverage. To address this exemption, one bill was introduced in the House and
another in the Senate, titled "Justice for Wards Cove Workers Act." See H.R. 3748, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1962, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The carving out of exceptions has created some confusion about retroactivity. This lack of clarity is aggravated by
various conflicting interpretive memos inserted into the legislative history by Senators.
337. See REs IPSA, Nov. 1991 [Lawyers' Committee newsletter, on file with author].
Lawyers' Committee provided a more elaborate interpretation on the retroactivity issue in a
January 24, 1992 memo as follows:
Sec. 108 of the Act limits challenges to litigated and consent judgments
and orders resolving employment discrimination claims where the challenging party
had sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard, 'prior to the entry of the
judgment or order.' This section is clearly worded so as to protect existing as well
as future judgments and orders where the statutory conditions are met, which obviously protects conduct that occurred prior to the enactment of the Act.
See. 112 of the Act expands the right to challenge discriminatory seniority
systems, even if the discriminatory aspects were adopted long before the challenge.
Under this section, the plain intent is that future challenges can be made to discriminatory seniority systems adopted before November 21, 1991.
Sec. 113 of the Act allows the award of expert fees in title VII actions
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("EEOC") interprets the 1991 Act as taking effect from the date of
enactment. 338 Under the EEOC's interpretation, discrimination occurring prior to the date of the Act, or suits filed before that date, cannot benefit from the mandates of the new law. 339 Legislative histories developed in both the Senate and House provide little guidance
because of conflicting views expressed in both forums.' Federal

and in "any" action or proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or the new § 1981A.
arguing that this provision allows the recovery of expert witness fees. Of necessity,
all awards will occur after November 21, 1991, but the statute does not indicate
that the court must disallow recovery for expert services performed before that
date. This is on all fours with the facts of Bradley.
Sec. 114 of the Act allows awards of interest on back pay in cases against
Federal agencies under section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 'to compensate for delay in payment It would violate the stated purpose if awards of interest
were limited to interest for the time after November 21.
Sec. 115(4) of the Act amends the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 by providing that ADEA charging parties may bring suit within 90 days
after the receipt of a Notice of Right to Sue. The language seems clearly applicable to charges already on file with the Commission, which, of course, would involve conduct that occurred prior to the Act's enactment. Unless the Act is interpreted to apply to pending cases, Congress may again have to enact special extensions of the suit-filing period because of the EEOC's delays in processing ADEA
charges. [footnote omitted].
See. 116 of the Act seeks to ensure that nothing in the Act could be con-

strued in a manner that would endanger otherwise lawful court-ordered remedies,
affirmative-action plans, and conciliation agreements which are otherwise in accordance with the law. The plain language of the section contemplates protection for
existing as well as future court orders, affirmative action, and conciliation agreements, all of which occurred before the Act and would therefore not need protection from the Act unless it applied to conduct occurring before its enactment.
338. See EEOC Policy Guidance on Retroactivity of Civil Rights Act of 1991, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at D-1 (Jan. 2, 1992).
339. IdL
340. Compare 137 CONG. REc. S15,483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Sen. Danforth's interpretation of no retroactivity) and id at S15,478 (Sen. Dole's interpretation of no retroactivity,
and citing with approval Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) and Kaiser
Aluminum. & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjomo, 110 S. Ct. 1570 (1990)) with 137 CONG. REc. at
S15,485 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see also id at S15,963 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy offering interpretation of retroactivity). Legislative history in the House
is similarly conflicting. Compare 137 CoNG. REC. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) which
states thatThe bill states that it takes effect on the date of enactment. The intent of the
sponsors is that this language be given its normal effect, and that the provisions of
the bill be applied to pending cases except where the bill expressly provides otherwise.. . . The application of this bill to pending cases is eminently fair. Much
of the conduct of employers and other respondents at issue in pending cases was
committed before the Supreme Court radically altered the legal landscape, at a time
when the defendants were on notice that the law applied to their conduct and they
could be held accountable for their misdeeds. Our restoration of the law to these
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courts are also split on this issue. 4 Unfortunately for discrimination
victims, however, the Court is likely to side with the EEOC 2 as
pending cases will often mean that the parties will be governed by the law they
all understood to exist at the time the actions in question were taken. To fail to
apply the law retroactively in these situations would give the respondents an undeserved windfall from the intervening Supreme Court errors. The application of this
bill to pending cases thus does not involve any of the problems of unfairness or
potential unconstitutionality which would have attended the retroactive imposition of
novel requirements, or those which would have been impossible to predict ....
Practical concerns, as well as those of elementary fairness, have led us to the conclusion that the application of the bill to pending cases is essential ....
with id. at H9548.
Section 402 of the Act specifies that the Act and the amendments made by the
Act take effect on the date of enactment. Accordingly they will not apply to cases
Not only would retroactive aparising before the effective date of the Act ....
plication of the Act and its amendments to conduct occurring before the date of
enactment be contrary to the language of section 402, but it would be extremely
unfair. For example, defendants in pending litigation should not be made subject to
awards of money damages of a kind and an amount that they could not possibly
have anticipated prior to the time suit was brought against them.
341. See, e.g., High v. Broadway Indus., Inc., No. 90-1066-CV-W-3, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 446 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 7, 1992) (no retroactivity); Burchfield v. Derwinski, 782 F. Supp.
532 (D. Colo. 1992) (no retroactivity); Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1077
(E.D. Va. 1992) (motion to amend national origin complaint to include compensatory and
punitive damages denied); Hansel v. Public Serv. Co., 778 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1991)
(same); Van Meter v. Barr, 778 F. Supp. 83 (D.D.C. 1991) (damage provisions of 1991 Act
not applicable to pending suit); James v. American Int'l Recovery, Inc., 57 Empl. Prac. Dec.
Cas. (BNA) 1226 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 3, 1991) (1991 Act does not apply to cases arising before
Act's effective date). But see Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., No. C-88-1467 MHP, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10789 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 1992) (statute's text only makes sense if applied to
pending cases); Mojica v. Gannett Co., No. 90-C-3827, 1992 WL 51685 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3,
1992) (damage provisions of 1991 Act applicable to pending cases); Graham v. Bodine Elec.
Co., 782 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (language of statute consistent with a conclusion of
retroactive application); La Cour v. Harris County, No. CIV.A.H-89-1532, 1991 WL 321020
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 1991) (granting jury trial in Title VII suit).
342. This persuasion is exemplified by Justice Scalia's argument in Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., v. Bonjomo, 494 U.S. 827, 841 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring), that non-penal
legislation must be applied prospectively unless Congress specifically provides otherwise.
Justice Scalia called on the Court to overrule Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974),
and adopt a presumption against retroactivity, as outlined in Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988). In Bradley, the Court held that the law in effect at the time of
decision should control, unless manifest injustice would result, or the statute or its legislative
history mandates otherwise. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711. Bradley rejected a requirement of clear
congressional intent as a prerequisite for applying intervening law to pending cases. Id. at
715. Later, in Bowen, the Court ruled that the congressional grant of rulemaking authority to
an agency does not include authority to promulgate retroactive rules unless such power was
conveyed in express terms, even if substantial justification for retroactivity exists. Bowen, 488
U.S. at 208-09.
The Kaiser decision avoided resolving the apparent conflict between Bowen and
Bradley by finding that the statute at issue clearly evidenced congressional intent against
retroactivity. See Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 837-38. The EEOC has decided to follow standards
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its jurisprudence43 shifts from presumption of retroactivity to clear
statement rules.

Although the Court will likely insist on prospective application
as the correct textual construction of the new Act, the law and equities favoring retroactivity are substantial. Title VII and § 1981 gave
employers notice that discriminatory conduct is prohibited. To the
extent that the Court interpreted these statutes incorrectly, thereby narrowing the rights and remedies of discrimination victims, employers
were given an undeserved windfall. In the 1991 Act, Congress established that many of the Court's interpretations were incorrect; therefore, the new legislation essentially constitutes deferred justice for
employees who were deprived of their original legal entitlements.
New provisions in the 1991 Act that expand antidiscrimination
laws may provide a stronger basis for challenge by employers. Un-,
fortunately, such challenges would to some extent be grounded in the
shameful proposition that discrimination is acceptable as long as it is
cost effective. To argue on notice grounds that the new compensatory
and punitive damages provisions should only have prospective application is in many ways to say, "I would not have discriminated had I
known it would cost me that much." In view of the national policy
favoring bias-free workplaces, and the many legal and policy justifications supporting retroactivity, the Court has ample rationale for such a
construction if it so chooses.
IV. THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Besides retroactivity, another critical employment issue, affirmative action, was left unresolved by the 1991 Act. As noted below,
Congress' failure to take this issue head-on was to some extent purposeful because of its political fragility.
A.

The Affirmative Action Debate

A key interpretive mechanism used by previous Justices to shore
outlined in Bowen.
343. See Hilda E. Kahn, Completed Acts, Pending Cases, and Conflicting Presumptions:
The Retroactive Application of Legislation After Bradley, 13 GEo. MASON U. L. REv. 231,
260 (1990) (suggesting that restorative amendments (which the 1991 amendments are) with
some support for retroactivity in the legislative history would be an insufficient showing to
overcome Bowen's clear intent requirement); William V. Luneburg, Retroactivity and Administrative Rulemaking, 1991 DuKE LJ. 106, 134-38, 142-49 (arguing that the Court does not
have a well articulated basis for its clear statement rules in Bowen, and suggesting the
demise of the Bradley line of cases).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss2/2

52

Plass: Bedrock Principles, Elusive Construction, and the Future of Equal
1992]

THE FUTURE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LAWS

365

up Title VII was the finding of support in the statute's legislative
history for a variety of affirmative action programs. 44 However, affirmative action has always been a thorny issue for the Court, and its
decisions on this subject lack coherence. Affirmative action in employment triggers emotional responses similar to concerns articulated
about preferential schemes in other areasS 45 Employment programs

344. In the past, the Court finessed its way around § 703(j)'s prohibition of preferential
treatment to any person or group by relying on § 706(g)'s grant of authority to the court to
.order such affirmative action as may be appropriate . . . or any other equitable relief as the
court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
345. Notably, the fields of education and public contracting trigger such emotional
responses. The Court first looked at affirmative action in the context of educational opportunities, and years later in the employment context. From the outset, the divisiveness of racial
preferences became apparent. In DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), the Court
avoided reviewing a law school preferential admissions scheme on mootness grounds. The
dissent accurately observed that few constitutional issues in recent history have stirred as
much debate, and warned that the questions avoided would return to the courts. Id at 350
(Brennan, J., dissenting). A few years later, they did. In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the challenged scheme was a medical school's preferential
admissions policy. The resulting decision set the stage for whittling away at reliance on
societal discrimination to support preferential schemes grounded in race through the imposition
of strict scrutiny standards. Id at 303. Bakke, an equal protection case, required identified
victims and a finding of a statutory or constitutional violation by a public body as necessary
predicates for a preferential admissions program. Id at 315-19. As such, the preferential
scheme cannot be supported solely by the disparate impact of a particular selection practice.
Id, Although Justice Powell concluded that the goal of diversity may be compelling in some
circumstances, programs must be narrowly tailored to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. Id
Special judicial attention to racial classifications evolved out of the Court's assessment
that minorities were underrepresented or excluded in the political process, and therefore
needed protection. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
The Bakke Court ruled that the strict scrutiny inquiry under Carolene Products was not
limited to situations where minorities are disadvantaged by racial classifications. Bakke, 438
U.S. at 290. This approach has survived, with heightened attention to the political strength of
minorities, and its role in establishing preferential schemes. Couched in the rhetoric of racial
politics, new-found political strength is seemingly more destructive of minority interests than
facilitative of a fair distribution of opportunities. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989); see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene
Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 685 (1991) (arguing that the original intent of Carolene Products's
minority-protective language retains vitality despite political gains made by minorities, and
that Justice Scalia and others' assessment that it is diffuse majority groups that are the
victims of the political process, and therefore harmed by affirmative action, is misplaced);
Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence of Denial and
Evasion, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1307, 1340-41 (1991) (noting that racial politics has always
infected the political process to the majority's advantage and to disallow minorities an
opportunity to remedy discrimination through the political process is itself discriminatory). In
fact, if the cliche "we've come a long way" is true, it is likely that affirmative action
promotes cohesiveness rather than divisiveness, since many blacks attribute their success to
such programs.
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that survived Court scrutiny did so essentially through avoidance of
thorny constitutional questions or through the use of broad statutory
interpretation methodologies. Now, analysis tied to race-neutral principles and questionable textualism appears fortified and ready to defeat
"goals and consequences" construction.
The redistributive goals of affirmative action are now being considered in the context of a sagging economy.? Diminishing employment opportunities have heightened tensions between those who
have and those who want access. The pressures of competition are
increasingly being felt in the political arena where candidates are
being fatally evaluated based on their position on preferential
schemes. 47
B.

The Employment Affirmative Action Cases

In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 8 Justice Brennan
wrote that Title VII permits voluntary affirmative action plans that
349
grant employment opportunity preferences to black employees.
Faced with language limitations in the statute specifically prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race,350 the Court narrowed its inquiry to whether the Act forbade the type of plan being challenged.35'
Ruling that the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII mandates were
not implicated, Justice Brennan relied on the statute's structure, its
legislative history and historical context to conclude that there was no
congressional intent to preclude private sector race-conscious pro-

346. Numerous writers have observed that redistributive programs such as affirmative
action fare better when labor markets are expanding. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS
OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 3 (1991); E. ALLAN LIND & ToM R. TYLER, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 151 (1988); John J. Donahue III & Peter
Siegelman, 7he Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV.
983, 999 (1991) (concluding that a strong economy and low unemployment are favorable
conditions for employment discrimination victims).
347. See infra note 426 and accompanying text.
348. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
349. 11 at 205-06.
350. The employee challenging the Weber plan cited the specific antidiscrimination
mandate of §§ 703(a) & (d) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) & (d), and a prior Court
decision interpreting Title VII as protecting black and white employees. See McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278 (1976) (holding that the Act prohibits discrimination against any racial group, minority, or majority).
351. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-01 (1979). The Court
noted that state action was not involved, the Equal Protection Clause was not implicated, and
the plan was adopted voluntarily. As such, the Court was not faced with interpreting Title
VII mandates or court-ordered remedies under Title VII. 11
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grams. 52 This conclusion drew extensive dissents from Justices Burger and Rehnquist, who regarded it as a clear departure from past
decisions and a usurpation of congressional power. 53 Both Justices
felt that clear text and plain meaning construction mandated a different result."3
Another pro-minority decision addressing what Title VII "per-

mits" was Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' InternationalAss'n
v. EEOC. 35 As framed by the Court, the issue in this case was
whether the Act prohibited court-ordered, race-based goals that benefitted individuals who were not identified victims of discrimination.356 By citing specific statutory authority for such goals, and referencing other provisions of the statute, previous administrative interpretations and Title VII's legislative history, Justice Brennan, in the
majority opinion, found that section 706(g)3 57 did not intend such a
general ban.35" However, the Court noted that judicial discretion
352. Id at 197. With respect to the statute's structure, the Court pointed to the text of §
703(j), which states:
Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer,
[or] . . . labor organization . . . subject to this title to grant preferential treatment
to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance . . . [in the
workforce].
Id at 205 n.5 (quoting § 7030) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j)).
Specifically, the Court noted that this provision stated that employers are not "required" to
adopt preferential schemes, and if Congress wanted to preclude voluntary efforts, it would
have provided that employers are not required or "permitted" to establish such schemes. Id
at 204-07. The Court reasoned that Congress' failure to include this additional limitation
evidenced an intent to grant employers flexibility to voluntarily undertake remedial efforts. Ad
The Court also concluded that a literal application of the statute would produce an absurd
resulL Ad at 204. It continued its analysis by moving from specific statutory mandate, to the
provisions' legislative history. Id at 203-08. It pointed to major elements of the plan that
parallel the purposes of the statute thereby making it permissible. Id at 208. For example,
the Court noted that the plan was designed to destroy old patterns of discrimination, did not
trammel the rights of white employees, and was temporary to eliminate racial imbalance. Id
353. Ad at 216, 219-55 (Burger, Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
354. Id at 217, 220-21. The dissenting Justices argued that the clarity of the statute
allowed literal and plain meaning construction. They therefore found the Court's use of
legislative history to trump plain text an attempt by the Court to rewrite, as opposed to construe, the legislation. The dissenters did not buy the Court's contention that legislative purpose should control because a literal application of the statute's text would produce an absurd
result, since, they argued, the legislative history did not grant anyone the right to discriminate.
355. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
356. AL at 446-47.
357. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
358. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 446-70. Although § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g) specifically prohibits ordering a union to admit employees not discriminated against,
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should be exercised with sensitivity, and that Congress did not intend
section 706(g) as a mechanism for achieving a racially balanced
workforce. 359 This decision triggered dissents from .four Justices
who essentially felt that the Court's interpretation of section 706(g)
conflicted with the mandates of section 703(j). The dissenters concluded that the statutory prohibition of quotas and the illegal displacement of nonminorities by minority nonvictims foreclosed the interpretation offered by the Court."
Another race-conscious plan under a court-approved consent decree was challenged in Local Number 93, International Ass'n of
Firefighters v. Cleveland.36' This challenge raised the question of
whether such a consent decree, which benefitted non-victims, violated
section 706(g) of Title V]1.

362

At the outset, the Court distinguished

consent decrees from court orders, so as to secrete such decrees from
the textual mandates of the statute. Once consent decrees were reJustices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens concluded that § 706(g) was not a general
ban on programs that benefit non-victims. First, the Court found that the statute specifically
granted broad discretion to courts to award "appropriate and "cquitable relief for unlawful
discrimination. Id at 446. Then it construed the last sentence of § 706(g), which provided:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual
as a member of a union . . . if such individual was refused admission, suspended,
or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement . . . for any reason other
than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin....
Id (quoting § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). The Court determined that although
this language prohibits a court from ordering a union to take remedial steps for reasons other
than discrimination, it did not say that a court may order relief "only" to actual victims. 1AL
at 446-77. In this regard, the Court distinguished between what the statute prohibits or
requires textually and what it permits as remedies. Id at 464. To confirm its interpretation,
the Court cited interpretations given by the EEOC and the Justice Department. Md.at 465-66.
Further confirmation was found by broadly construing the remedial parameters of the statute.
Id at 465-70. The Court found that the actual mandate of § 706(g) may be overridden when
there is a finding of persistent and egregious discrimination because the statute gives district
courts broad discretion to grant equitable relief to remedy discrimination. Id at 446-51.
Earlier interpretations of § 706(g) were also grounded in broad statutory goals, but
only addressed relief concerns for actual victims. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
359. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 453. Justice Powell, who joined the majority
opinion, supported the court-ordered plan because of the egregious violations involved and his
judgment that the goal was not a quota. However, he cautioned that if the goal required
replacements of journeymen because of race, he would not have supported the decision. Id at
483-89.
360. Justices O'Connor, White, Rehnquist, and Burger shared these concerns. Id at 489500.
361. 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
362. See id at 515.
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moved from the reach of the statutory prohibition applicable to court
orders, the road was paved for the Court's conclusion that consent
decrees may benefit non-victims and still be "approved" by a
court.363 Support for this conclusion was found in the voluntariness
of consent decrees, and their furtherance of Title Vil's fundamental
objective of voluntary compliance."' According to the Court, the
fact that a court might not be empowered to enforce challenged portions of the decree later found to be unlawful, did not deprive that
court of the authority to approve the decree from the outset. 6 The
dissenting Justices argued that the language of section 706(g) and
Title VII generally, did not support the Court's construction."
They also maintained concerns about burdening nonminority victims
and the need for proven discrimination under the statute, as a predicate for a preferential plan.3"
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 368 the Court continued to
breathe life into preferential employment schemes through a broad
interpretation of Title VII. In Johnson, a public employer's voluntary
adoption of a plan with goals for minorities and women was at issue.369 Under the plan, a qualified female employee was awarded a
position over a male employee who scored higher than she did during
the interviewing process. 37 ° Despite the clear language of section
703 prohibiting discrimination against "any individual," and lower
court findings that sex was the determining factor in the employer's
decision, the Court ruled that the employer's action was not forbidden
by Title VII. The Court relied on its analysis in Weber and the importance of voluntariness in the statute's design, to support its conclusion. In a plurality opinion, Justice Brennan rejected the contention
that such a plan can only be supported by an imbalance in the job

363. Id at 518-24. Six justices agreed with this position, relying heavily on Weber, although Weber was a private sector case which did not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment,
and did not deal with a consent decree.
364. Id at 515-19.

365. Id at 528-30. The Court determined that the consent decree was valid because it
did not bind the objecting union. Id at 529-30.
366. Id at 531-35 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that §§ 703 and 706(g) refute the
Court's conclusion); id at 535-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that Court precedent and
the language of § 706(g) does not support the Court's interpretation).
367. Justices White and Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, noted these concerns. Id at
531-32, 535, 540-41.
368. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
369. Id at 619-20.
370. Id at 624-25.
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category significant enough to support a prima facie case against the
employer.3"
The Court noted that sex was one of many factors considered,
that the male employee did not have an absolute entitlement to the
position, and the plan did not unnecessarily trammel the rights of
male employees.31 Moreover, the Court added that the plan was designed to "attain" rather than "maintain" a balanced workforce.373
Justice Scalia wrote a stinging dissent, chiding the Court for departing
from the plain text and precedent forbidding reliance on societal discrimination. Even more, he charged the Court with expanding the
meaning of the statute to compel discrimination. 7
375 is another instructive and minorityUnited States v. Paradise
friendly employment affirmative action case. The equal protection
challenge in this case stemmed from a court-ordered decree mandating
greater integration within Alabama's Department of Public Safety.376
Finding that the Department of Public Safety failed to make proper
progress under the decree that set a goal of twenty-five percent representation for black state troopers, the district court ordered the Department to award at least fifty percent of its promotions to the rank
of corporal to black troopers, if qualified blacks were available. 3 "
This order was challenged on equal protection grounds, but it was
upheld on the basis that it survived strict scrutiny analysis. 378 The
plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan, found the court order
not to be a goal by itself but a device to achieve a goal.379 Further,

371. Id at 630. Justice O'Connor, in her opinion, concurring in the judgment, stated that
a plan must rest on a "manifest imbalance" in the job category. Id at 649 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment).
372. Id at 638. The Court analogized the program to the Harvard plan that Justice
Powell endorsed in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 483 U.S. 265 (1978).
373. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639.
374. See id at 657, 665, 667, 669-70, 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
375. 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (involving a decree requiring the Alabama Department of
Public Safety to refrain from engaging in employment discrimination, including in promo-

tions).
376. Id at 149-66 (discussing the procedural history and facts of the case).
377. Id at 162-63.
378. Id at 167. In a plurality opinion, Justice Brennan noted that the Court had not yet
reached a consensus on the appropriate review standard for "remedial" schemes. However,
because this goal satisfied strict scrutiny standards, resolution of that issue was not a prerequisite to resolving this case. Id Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, but felt that
standards set out in the school desegregation cases should govern. Id at 189-95 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
379. See id at 179-80 (noting that "the 50% figure is not itself the goal; rather it
represents the speed at which the goal of 25% will be achieved").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss2/2

58

Plass: Bedrock Principles, Elusive Construction, and the Future of Equal
1992]

THE FUTURE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LAWS

the Court ruled that the order was temporary and would end once the
Department devised a plan that did not have a discriminatory impact
on blacks. 8 °
The predictive value of the pro-affirmative action cases has declined dramatically because of the Court's changed composition. The
new Justices (Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas) are likely to join Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, White, and O'Connor in interpreting Title VII,
detached from its legislative history.3 81 Absence of an affirmative
action mandate in Title VII forced the Court in the past to devote a
great deal of analytic energy to "what is permissible or not prohibited" under the statute as opposed to what the statute requires. The
1991 Act did not fill this void, thereby making the cases rejecting
such analysis increasingly instructive, because the dissenters of yesterday are a majority today. As a result, the two employment cases
noted below and the Croson decision are emerging as more reliable
guides in this area.
First, in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 2 seniority principles were elevated above a protective scheme for black employees. In Stotts, a consent decree establishing hiring and promotion
goals for blacks was at issue. As applied, this decree allowed junior
black employees to displace senior white employees during a layoff,
unless the collective bargaining contract's seniority provision was
enforced. 3 The district court enjoined the operation of the seniority
system which resulted in the layoff of senior white employees."'
Writing for the Court, Justice White dismissed the injunction on the
narrow proposition that section 703(h) of Title VII prohibits interference with bona fide seniority systems. 38 5 Justice White further found
that the consent decree did not address the issue of layoffs, and that
the lower court did not have authority to modify its decree when

380. Id at 178. The dissenters focused on "relief," and found that this aspect of the
decision failed strict scrutiny review standards because it was not narrowly tailored. See id at
196 (White, J., dissenting); id at 201 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
381. See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 201, at 656-66 (noting that Justice Scalia's brand of
textualism, which attempts to avoid legislative history at all costs, has been influencing the
Court).
382. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
383. Id at 565-68.
384. Id at 568.
385. See id. at 576-78 (noting that § 703(h) allows different standards of compensation
terms or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority system, and that
Memphis's system qualified as such). The Court could have ruled this was an impermissible
affirmative action plan because it discriminated against white employees.
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such modification would interfere with a bona fide seniority system.386 Further, the beneficiaries of the decree were not identified
victims of discrimination.3 8 7 By limiting the operation of this consent decree, Stotts triggered questions about when and how judicial
remedies may be granted in Title VII cases.388
Second, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,389 a preferential scheme for black teachers was trumped by the application of
strict scrutiny standards. This case presented facts and issues similar
to Stotts, except the layoff plan benefitting black teachers was voluntarily negotiated by the union and the School Board.3 1 In a plurality opinion, Justice Powell rejected the plan on equal protection
grounds. Reliance on societal discrimination, in conjunction with role
model arguments tied to the goal of proportional representation for
minority students and teachers, was determined to be an insufficient
factual predicate to support the plan.39 ' By distinguishing the layoffs
in this case from hiring goals, and noting the absence of judicial
findings that the School Board engaged in discrimination, Justice
Powell went on to recognize that public sector employers may only
engage in affinative action under certain circumstances.3 9
More recently, the affirmative action debacle moved from employment to entrepreneurship in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co. 39 In Croson, the city's thirty percent set-aside program for minority contractors was challenged on equal protection grounds.3
The plan was invalidated in a majority opinion authored by Justice
O'Connor. Applying strict scrutiny standards,395 the Court found that
386. Id at 576-80.

387. Id at 579-80 (referring to § 706(g), Justice White noted that the provision's makewhole purpose only runs to actual victims).
388. Stotts raised questions about what constraints courts must operate under when
ordering goals, etc., to protect minority employees. The case established that a bona fide
seniority system under § 703(h), cannot be overridden by a consent decree, "modified" to
protect minority employees who are not identified victims of discrimination. See generally id
389. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).

390.

d at 270.

391. Id at 274-76. Justice O'Connor joined Justice Powell in this conclusion, id at 288
(O'Connor, J., concurring), and Justice Powell further stated that layoff is not a permissible
affirmative action methodology because it places the entire burden of remediation on "particular" persons, id at 283.
392. Id at 277. Justice O'Connor, however, did not agree that proven discrimination was
an indispensable predicate for preferential schemes. Id at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring). It
also appeared that Justice Powell's requirement of findings of discrimination was not limited
to pre-program findings. Id. at 286.
393. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
394. Id at 476-77.
395. The Court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment protects each individual from
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the city did not rely on the requisite foundational findings of discrimination in the city's construction industry that could justify race-driven
contract awards. 3" Further, the plan was not narrowly tailored, and
race neutral alternatives were not considered. 3 7 The Croson Court
relied on the "American" principle of color-blindness, citing the evils
of quotas to justify its conclusions. Justice Scalia, concurring in the
judgment, wrote: "When we depart from this American principle we
play with fire, and much more than an occasional DeFunis, Johnson,
or Croson burns."398
The Court's latest word on preferential schemes came in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.399 Here, the Court dealt with a Fifth
Amendment equal protection challenge to two FCC policies that gave
an edge to minorities." In his departing opinion, and writing for a
majority, Justice Brennan found that these benign congressional policies, even though not "remedial," are constitutionally permissible." 1
The Court held that such programs were valid if they served important governmental objectives and are substantially related to achieving
those objectives. Programming and broadcast diversity, the foundation
of the program, were determined to be important governmental objectives, and the policies were determined to be substantially related to
achieving those objectives.' Justice Thomas, who replaced Justice
rigid rules that deprive them of personal rights on the basis of race. It further found that
searching judicial inquiry is the only means by which courts can ferret out which classifications are benign or remedial, and which are motivated by racial politics and are therefore
illegal. The Court also noted concerns about stigmatic harm and reinforcement of stereotypes
if racial classifications were not reserved for remedial settings. Id at 493.
396. Id at 505-06. Generalized findings of discrimination in the construction industry
were found to be a faulty guide for a remedial scheme that addressed low participation of
minority contractors in the local construction industry. Id at 504-05. The Court ruled that the
city's findings did not come close to establishing a constitutional violation, and the program
failed to consider the race-neutral factors that may account for any disparity. Id at 507.
397. Id at 507-10. The Court ruled that, at best, the city's program was maintained for
administrative convenience, because no attempt was made to determine whether participating
minority contractors had been discriminated against. As such, the city's assumption that
minority contractors will enter the construction industry in lockstep proportion to their representation in the population was unfounded. Id
398. Id at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
399. 110 S. CL 2997 (1990).
400. Id at 3002.
401. Id at 3008-09. The Court distinguished action taken by state and local governments,
which are governed by Croson's strict scrutiny standards, from action taken by the federal
government, which is entitled to great deference. Id; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980). Further, the Court found that Congress can remediate in reliance on societal
discrimination, and stands above racial politics which may be used as a means of discriminating. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. CL at 3009.
402. Id Justice O'Connor dissented, and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
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Marshall, a key supporter of the Metro Broadcasting decision, sees
this issue differently. 3
C.

The 1991 Act's Response

In enacting the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress was not immune
from evaluative pressures, particularly since public confidence in the
To get bipartisan support, the
legislative process has declined.'
1991 Act was pitched as a restorative measure rather than expansive
or new legislation. Once couched in restorative terms, members of
Congress who supported affirmative action had to tread lightly when
discussing this issue, because Title VII did not explicitly provide for
such programs. As shown in the cases, affinative action jurisprudence under Title VII was essentially developed by the Court. The
1991 Act provides: "Nothing in the amendments made by this title
shall be construed to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action,
05
or conciliation agreements, that are in accordance with the law."
Senator Kennedy interpreted the Act as approving affirmative action

Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice O'Connor found that the majority's decision did violence
to the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution, and that strict scrutiny was required for
these FCC policies. Id at 3029. Justice O'Connor maintained her federal/state distinction
articulated in Croson by conceding wide remedial latitude for Congress under the Fourteenth
Amendment, but noted the inapplicability of such congressional freedom in this case. Id at
3030. Justice O'Connor also found the lack of specific evidence of discrimination and hence
the need for remedial measures problematic. Id at 3033-43; see also Charles Fried, Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REV. 107 (1990)
(criticizing the Court for departing from strict scrutiny as a criterion for decisionmaking, and
warning. of the dangers to individualism if diversity can be casually cited to support government action when race is used by the government).
403. See Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that the awarding of
extra credit to female broadcasters on the basis of sex violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
404. To the extent that a fair process can protect against fallout from what may be
viewed as unfair results, Congress is deprived of this cushion. See LIND & TYLER, supra
note 346, at 163 (stating that, "[a]Ithough citizens may react to policies in part on the basis
of personal gains or losses from these policies, their sense of distributive and procedural
justice will act as a cushion of support, leading them to accord some support to policies and
leaders if they view them as having acted fairly"). This theory is probably not workable,
however, in an environment where individuals are battling to support themselves and their
families and care more about results than procedures.
405. § 116, 105 Stat. at 1079. The legislation does not reflect an affimnative statutory
mandate, or even an "adoption and encouragement" approach for affirmative action, and also
failed to grant specific authorization to the states to adopt such plans. For a discussion of
Congress' power to authorize such schemes, see Mary C. Daly, Some Runs, Some Hits, Some
Errors-Keeping Score in the Affirmative Action Ballparkfrom Weber to Johnson, 30 B.C. L.
REV. 1, 88 (1988).
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law as it is currently written.'

Senator Hatch, however, construed

the legislation as being entirely neutral on this subject.

7

Legislative

history as developed in the House is even more at odds. 40' Even
President Bush joined the interpretive fray by signaling his disapproval of protective programs. One day before signing the legislation, the
President issued a directive, originally included in his signing state-

ment, discontinuing preferential schemes in federal agencies.' Although this directive was withdrawn, other aspects of the signing
statement remain potentially destructive legislative history.41

°

406. 137 CONG. REC. S15,235 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (stating that "the bill is intended
not to change the law regarding what constitutes lawful affirmative action and what constitutes impermissible reverse discrimination").
407. Id at S15,320 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (stating that the Act "expresses neither
Congressional approval nor disapproval of any judicial decision affecting court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements including the Weber, Johnson, Local 78,
and Paradise Supreme Court decisions").
408. Compare id at H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991),
Section 116 provides that nothing in this legislation is to be construed to affect
court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements that are otherwise in accordance with the law a [sic] previously established by Congress in Title
VII and by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court The intent of this
provision is clear: the legislation is not intended to change in any way what constitutes lawful affirmative action or what constitutes impermissible reverse discrimination from what the law was prior to the legislation. A provision evidencing this
intent has been included in every proposed version of the legislation since it was
introduced in 1990, and every version has been explained by its sponsors in the
same way: the intent is to leave things the way they were before passage of the
legislation with respect to the legality of affirmative action.
with id. at H9548, stating that:
This legislation does not purport to resolve the question of the legality under Title
VII of affirmative action programs that grant preferential treatment to some on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, and thus 'tend to deprive'
other 'individual[s] of employment opportunities . . . on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.' In particular, this legislation should in no way be
seen as expressing approval or disapproval of United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979), or Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), or
any other judicial decision affecting court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or
conciliation agreements.
409. The order stated. "Any regulation, rule, enforcement practice, or other aspect of
these programs that mandates, encourages, or otherwise involves the use of quotas, preferences, set-asides, or other similar devices, on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, is to be terminated as soon as is legally feasible." Signing Statement-S. 1745, "Civil
Rights Act of 1991." [Directive on file with author]
410. The order was withdrawn after it was leaked and met with stiff resistance from
numerous legislators and the civil rights community. See R.A. Zaldivar & Aaron Epstein,
Bush Signs Rights Bill Amid Dispute: Critics Claim an Attempt at Sabotage, MiAMI HERALD,
Nov. 22, 1991, at Al, 21A ("Some Democrats boycotted the signing ceremony, and some
civil rights advocates said they believe the episode shows that the administration will keep
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Another key provision affecting affirmative action is section 106,
which states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in
connection with the selection or referral of applicants or candidates
for employment or promotion, to adjust the scores of, use different
cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of, employment
related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."
This provision has been regarded as having the potential to end affirmative action.4" 2 However, adjustments made as part of a "legititrying to sabotage the new law."). This move by the President, which was viewed as an attempt to undermine the statute, is reminiscent of President Reagan's politically manipulative
use of signing statements. See William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative
History: A Critique, 66 IND. LJ. 699, 708-09, 713-14 (1991). Under the Reagan Administration, Attorney General Meese convinced the publishers of the United States Code Congressional and Administrative News that presidential signing statements should be included in the
Legislative History Section of that publication. President Reagan, unlike his predecessors, used
signing statements to advocate a position on unresolved politically sensitive issues or to offer
a construction that undermined the statutory structure. Id at 704-05. Because the Supreme
Court has historically considered and relied on views of the executive branch, particularly to
confirm plain meaning construction, the President's directive had far-reaching implications. See
Allison C. Giles, Note, The Value of Nonlegislators' Contributions to Legislative History, 79
GEo. L.J. 359, 363 nn.21 & 23 (1990) (noting how a study of this subject showed the Court
considering the views of the executive branch more often than any other nonlegislativo
source, and using it most often to confirm plain meaning construction). This data is particularly instructive because of the 1991 Act's limited statement on affirmative action, and the
present Court's overwhelming preference for narrow construction of civil rights legislation.
The President's retraction of his directive does not resolve the issue favorably for civil
rights advocates, however. The signing statement retained an endorsement of Senator Dole's
memo inserted into the legislative record by regarding that memo as authoritative interpretive
guidance. Senator Dole's statement argued that the new law does not address the legality of
affirmative action programs. See 137 CONG. REC. S15,477-78 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991):
This legislation does not purport to resolve the question of the legality under Title
VII of affirmative action programs that grant preferential treatment to some on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and thus "tend to deprive"
other -individual[s] of employment opportunities ...on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin." In particular, this legislation should in no way be
seen as expressing approval or disapproval of United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979), or Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), or
any other judicial decision affecting court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or
conciliation agreements.
As a result, the President's statement still provides potent authority for a Court that seems all
too willing to reshape the law in this area. Even if the Court abides by a textual methodology of statutory construction, and therefore refuses to consider the President and Senator
Dole's statements, it could find sufficient interpretive flexibility from the words of the statute
to prohibit affirmative action.
411. § 106, 105 Stat. at 1075.
412. See Graglia, supra note 199, at 1138.
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mate" affirmative action plan will likely satisfy court scrutiny.
These two statutory provisions leave affirmative action programs
on a precarious footing."a 3 The statutory text says that preferential
adjustments should not be made for protected class members, but at
the same time takes a hands-off approach by avoiding Supreme Court
decisions upholding such preferences. By providing that affirmative
action that is "in accordance with the law" is unaffected, Congress
left the Court broad discretion to determine when a plan is lawful.
The failure to codify decisions such as Weber and Johnson allows the
Court to interpret the Act's text as generally prohibiting preferential
schemes except to the extent that it determines that they are lawful.
Using textualist methodology, the Court can easily avoid legislative
history which in this case is replete with conflicting statements. Further, the defeat of the 1990 Act based on allegations that it was a
quota bill, in addition to the President's directive discontinuing federal
programs, may quietly assure the Court that a construction prohibiting
affirmative action generally is desirable.
D. Interpreting the 1991 Act
As noted earlier, there is clear evidence of growing support for
plain text analysis. Under this interpretive methodology, distinctions
between what the statute requires or permits will likely dissipate as
the Court focuses more on what the statute states. Clear language will
be literally enforced even if the spirit of the statute or its goals are
frustrated. Reliance on legislative history may decline, and will therefore be unavailable to trump plain text or circumvent literal application that would produce absurd results. Only those employers that can
demonstrate constitutional or statutory violations will be eligible to
implement remedial schemes.4 14 As such, reliance on societal discrimination will be defective.415 Second, only preferential plans that

413. Another provision implicated in the affimnative action debate is § 105. The business
necessity provision in § 105 did not resolve the question of what the employer's burden is in
disparate impact cases. As a result, it is unclear whether employers will implement affirmative
action plans on the premiss that they could not satisfy the statute's burden of proof requirements after plaintiff has shown an imbalance in the workforce.
414. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, White, and Scalia hold this position,
and now have the benefit of three additional conservative Republican appointees: Justices
Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. This thinking was first developed in Hazelwood Sch. Dist v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), a Title VII case that outlined the statistical comparisons
that are probative in establishing a statutory violation.
415. Notwithstanding the continuing recognition of disparate impact suits under Title
VII, particularly in light of the tightened rules under Wards Cove and the 1991 Act's failure
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benefit identified victims of wrongdoing will be recognized. 416 Further, programs that deprive others of opportunities, or require that
they bear burdens or make sacrifices, will not be upheld.417
Justices Powell, Brennan, and Marshall, who considered statutory
and historical context plus legislative history to avoid frustrating
statutory goals, have retired. These Justices also accepted less than
prima facie violations of the law as valid foundations for remedial or
affirmative action programs. As a result, the Court now lacks several
Justices who were willing to go beyond textual mandate to attain the
goals of civil rights legislation. The Court now has a solid majority
of Justices whose interpretive methodology is known more for defeating civil rights plaintiffs' claims
and attempts at remediation, than for
41
accounting for past injustices.

to completely change those rules.
416. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Firefighters
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579 (1984) (stating that even identified
victims may have to wait for vacancies).
417. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284 (1986) (holding that the
selection of layoffs as the means to accomplish even a valid purpose cannot satisfy the
demands of the Equal Protection Clause); Stotts, 467 U.S. at 579 (stating that, "[e]ven when
an individual shows that the discriminatory practice has had an impact on him, he is not
automatically entitled to have a nonminority laid off to make room for him. He may have to
wait until a vacancy occurs"); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979) (upholding an affirmative action plan that did not require the discharge of white
workers and their replacement with black hirees).
418. From the outset, Justice White and Chief Justice Rehnquist had narrow ideas about
the protection afforded by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 42 U.S.C. § 1981. They felt
that the provision's legislative history and Court dictum supported a conclusion that private
individuals are not required to enter into contractual relations with blacks, even if the motivation is discrimination. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 192-95 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting). At the same time, these Justices support the view expounded by Justice Marshall,
that Title VII protects blacks and whites from discrimination. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976). Justice White, in turn, joined Justice Rehnquist in
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978), to reaffirm this proposition.
Subsequently, Justice Remquist took the position that the legislative history of Title VII does
not support a conclusion that Congress authorized affirmative action programs. Weber, 443
U.S. at 244-46 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined him in reaffirming this
conclusion years later in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 670 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, although concurring in the judgment in Johnson, noted that
her decision rested on stare decisis principles. She adverted to her strong support for Justice
Scalia's position because the Court had "chosen to follow an expansive and ill-defined
approach to voluntary affirmative action by public employers despite the limitations imposed
by the Constitution and by the provisions of Title VII... ." Id at 648 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Relying on the persuasive force of Justice Scalia's dissent, Justice O'Connor suggested that if the issue of overniling Weber was put squarely before the Court, her leanings
favored Weber's demise. Id Justice Kennedy, the likely fifth vote, is a strict constructionist.
Although his views have not been fully disclosed, his dissent in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
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Congress' neutrality on affirmative action in the 1991 Act further
weakens the foundation laid by prior Justices for such programs
through broad construction of Title V1L419 The President's directive
when he signed the new law, that federal agencies must phase out
regulations authorizing racial preferences, signals continuing hostility
to affirmative action, and ratifies the Court's universal colorblind
analysis. As a result, employment affirmative action which represents
equal employment opportunity "on the cheap " now seems to have

FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3028 (1990), and his opinion in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164 (1989), are telling. Other likely supportive votes include Justices Souter and
Thomas, both of whom are strict constructionists.
419. Statutory purpose and congressional inaction were cited in Weber and Johnson as
evidence of congressional endorsement of affirmative action schemes. Weber, 443 U.S. at
204-07; see also id at 216 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("And if the Court has misperceived
the political will, it has the assurance that because the question is statutory Congress may set
a different course if it so chooses."); Johnson, 480 U.S. at 629 n.7. But see -id at 671-72
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that congressional inaction does not prove judicial correctness
because of the many and competing variables that may cause legislative acquiescence).
420. See CARTER, supra note 346, at 72, 80, 82-84 (arguing that America is getting a
bargain with affirmative action that never reached the oppressed masses of blacks, and has
thereby avoided bearing the true costs of equality). Many blacks see reparations for slavery
and its legacy as a more responsible accounting for human and civil rights violations. See
Derek Reveron, Blacks are Told Economically They May Never Catch Up, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 27, 1991, at 1K (Dean of business school at Jackson State University proposes a $600
billion to $1 trillion reparations plan to compensate blacks for lost economic opportunities
caused by slavery); see also BORIS L BrrrKER, TBE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973);
Darrell Dawsey, Civil Rights Activist Campaigns for Slavery Reparations, MIAMt HERALD,
Feb. 16, 1991, at 25A (Civil rights activist still fighting for his forty acres and a mule);
CAPIrrAL SPOTLIGHT, Jan. 17, 1991 (Nigerian President calls on western nations to compensate
for slavery contending it marginalized Africa).
However, the imponderables of reparations for slavery are many. See Derrick A. Bell,
Jr., Dissection of a Dream, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 156, 159-65 (1974) (reviewing
Professor Bittker's book and highlighting constitutional, jurisdictional, and procedural difficulties that affect congressional and court authority to grant reparations, problems of identifying
defendants, and measuring and paying damages). Professor Bell concluded that it would be a
miracle if Congress enacted reparations legislation, and suggested that even if reparations
advocates had a foolproof legal strategy, it would never be adopted. lid at 165. Despite the
limitations articulated by professor Bell, legislation for reparations was introduced recently.
See H.R. 1684, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). However, professor Bell's assessment seems
prophetic. Billeast reported the odds that H.R. 1684 will pass as ten percent in the House
Committee on the Judiciary, eight percent in the Senate Committee, nine percent on the
House floor, and seven percent in the Senate.
The lack of congressional interest in this area presents a bitter irony for blacks
because of Congress' recent expenditure of $1.25 billion to Japanese Americans interned
during the second world war. See S. 1093, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S5222-35
(daily ed. May 2, 1985) (providing for payments of $20,000 to individuals who are members
of the class of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry who were victims of World War
H1internment orders). The checks and letters of apology were actually delivered in October
1990, and some internees refused compensation. Japanese American Internees Get Checks,
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a bleak future.421
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,4" Justice Stevens, referring to classwide discrimination against black Americans, wrote: "[T]he wrong
committed against the Negro class is both so serious and so pervasive
that it would constitutionally justify an appropriate class-wide recov-

MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 10, 1990, at 5A. For some background on the Japanese internment
cases and subsequent developments, see Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943) (upholding second conviction in reliance on Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943));
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. 115 (upholding constitutionality of, and conviction under, military
curfew orders promulgated under authority conferred by Executive Order No. 9066). The
constitutionality of military orders stemming from the war and Executive Order No. 9066 was
again challenged in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Again, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of another exclusion order and a conviction thereunder. L; see
also Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (successfully challenging detainment at a
relocation center). In 1980, Congress established the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians ("CWRIC"), to review Executive Order No. 9066 and make recommendations. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Govtl. Relations of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Ses. 1 (1980). Information acquired by the
CWRIC essentially established that the military orders promulgated pursuant to Executive
Order No. 9066 were not justified by military necessity. Relying on newly discovered evidence, Korematsu, Yasui, and Hirabayashi filed petitions for writs of error coram nobis to
vacate their convictions. Korematsu's and Hirabayashi's writs were granted, Hirabayashi v.
United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406
(N.D. Cal. 1984), while Yasui's petition was dismissed on mootness grounds because of his
death, Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985). Based on the findings of the
CWRIC, legislation was introduced to acknowledge the wrong, apologize to the affected
individuals, educate the public, make restitution, prevent similar wrongdoing in the future, and
credibly declare to the world this country's commitment to human rights. See H.R. 442, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 131 CONG. REC. E61 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (titled "Civil Liberties Act of
1985"). This legislation passed easily and set the stage for the appropriation of $1.25 billion
to compensate internees. For a general treatment of this subject, see Barbara L. Tang, Note,
The Japanese Internment and Reparations: Creating a Judicial or Statutory Cause of Action
Against the Federal Government for Constitutional Violations, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 979
(1988).
Even more ironic was Congress' indifference to the many theoretic limitations advocated against reparations. See generally Mad J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.RI-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (discussing and rejecting
arguments that compensation to one group may result in an unending clamor for compensation by other harmed groups; that the lengthy passage of time has made such claims stale;
that insurmountable difficulties will be encountered in trying to identify wrongdoers and vic-

tims; and that damages may be incalculable). In fact, in making the appropriations for
Japanese Americans, Congress cited many of the arguments advocates for reparations for
blacks have made over the years. See 131 CONG. RFC. E61-62 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985). In
addition to the symbolic value of an apology, Congress recited the educative, preventive,
deterrence, restitution, and human rights functions of reparations. Id.
421. See CARTER, supra note 346, at 17-18. Professor Carter observes that affirmative
action that is redistributive in nature will always face strong opposition from middle class
Americans.
422. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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ery measured by a sum certain for every member of the injured
class." 2 The more popular view on remedial measures, however,
seems to be Justice O'Connor's sentiment that "It]he dream of a
Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of
shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past
'
wrongs."424
Plain meaning construction, strict scrutiny standards, and
"American" principles of justice, which always seemingly fail to
account for injustices against minorities, are now at the helm. As a
consequence, the quest for equal employment will be limited to equal
treatment, leaving equal achievement purely aspirational.4" The
"American dreams" analysis of Weber is now faltering under the
"American principles" rationale of Croson.
CONCLUSION

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 reflects significant congressional26
4
achievement that will become increasingly difficult to duplicate.
The provision for compensatory and punitive damages is certainly an
accomplishment. 4 7 So, also, is protection for post-contract discrimination, expanded coverage for particular groups, and other gains noted
herein. However, standards outlined in the 1991 Act and those set out
by the Court that were left intact, which predicate liability only upon
proof of illegal motive, present formidable obstacles for discrimination
victims. Satisfying the motive-based requirements which pervade the
statute is going to be very difficult. Meeting impact standards that require identifying specific practices and showing causation will be

423.
424.
425.
see Fiss,

Id at 537 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
City of Richmond v. LA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989).
For a discussion of the dichotomy between equal treatment and equal achievement,
supra note 199, at 235-49.

426. Politically, affirmative action and other protective schemes for minorities are so
unpopular that Senate seats and governors' mansions are being determined by how closely
candidates align themselves with minority interests. See Robert S. Boyd, A Word from the
Voters Discontent: Incumbents Get Message, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 7, 1991, at IA, 22A ("In
Mississippi, white voters, resentment of welfare and affTrmative action to benefit blacks
elected a Republican governor."). Harris Wofford, the Democrat who defeated former Republican Attorney General Richard Thornburg for a Pennsylvania Senate seat, advised Democrats
to avoid getting "too deeply involved in targeting programs for the poor." Id The American

voters' sense of fairness is now being fired more by self interest than by sensitivity to racial
injustices.
427. Since the Act's passage, legislation has been introduced in an attempt to get the
damage caps removed. See Equal Remedies Act of 1991, 137 CONG. REc. S18336 (daily ed.
Nov. 29, 1991).
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equally tough. If the Court continues to use stringent proof requirements, the future may bear limited successes for employment discrimination plaintiffs. Moreover, congressional neutrality on remedial
schemes and lack of clarity on retroactivity gives this strict constructionist Court an out to apply neutral principles and detach itself from
remediation or true make-whole responsibilities. Having survived
legislative, political and intellectual critics, remediation now comes
head to head with a conservative Supreme Court. It is doubtful that
remedial schemes can survive this formidable opponent. Therefore,
strategies that effectively respond to the Court's analytic methodology
and popular sensitivities are key to the future success of civil rights
litigants.
In increasingly competitive employment and entrepreneurial markets, people are extremely sensitive about job opportunities. Bearing
burdens for equality and remediation, however slight, is not an attractive proposition for workers.4 s The idea that fault should be the basis of liability and remediation is being effectively transferred to the
employment area.429 Attenuated wrongs or those not directly traceable to an employer's conduct are increasingly regarded as failing to
provide the required nexus that forms the basis for liability.43 Unpersuasive is the argument that beneficiaries of a wrong should shoulder some of the burdens of remediation. The political battles that
were waged to pass the new civil rights law reflect the unpopularity

428. A popular sentiment in the nation today is that blacks gained unearned advantages
through legislation, court decisions, and government programs. For a good discussion of how
the Reagan administration took advantage of this sentiment, see Randall Kennedy, Persuasion
and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1327 (1986);
Patricia 1. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104
HARV. L. REV. 525 (1990).
429. Although many individuals benefit directly from discrimination or its legacy, see
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 561 (1989) (Blackanun, J., dissenting),
the prevailing attitude seems to be that those who are negatively impacted by affirmative
action qualify more as innocent victims than wrongdoers, see Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986); see also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
666-67 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (affirmative action programs likely to affect classes of
individuals unlikely to have been victims of historic societal discrimination). But see Thomas
Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 308-15 (1990) (the rhetoric
of innocence is a powerful symbol in our culture because of its ties to religion, chastity, and
freedom from guilt; but pervasive unconscious racism belies any claim of innocence); see
also Charles R. Lawrence HI, The L4 the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324-25 (1987) (stating that by requiring that a blameworthy perpetrator be identified before discrimination is recognized, the Court distorts reality
and destroys the foundation for remediation).
430. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 644, 657 (1989).
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of statutory protection for particular groups. Even more troublesome
and unpopular are remedial schemes that prefer particular groups.
This unpopularity suggests that minorities and women may one day
find the congressional well dry, and they should therefore begin designing strategies that can survive the Court's bedrock construction
and textualist analytic schemes.
Judicial resort to textual construction and bedrock Anglo-American jurisprudential principles that defeat civil rights claims comes at a
particularly precarious time for discrimination victims who now compete for employment opportunities in a shrinking job market. Acrossthe-board judicial subscription to such principles, coupled with increasing opposition to affirmative action programs and the imponderables of reparations, signal the demise of any attempt at serious accounting for wrongs committed against members of protected classes.
If the latest Supreme Court decisions signal a conviction that a sufficient period for remediation has elapsed, fairness dictates that, where
appropriate, bedrock jurisprudential principles and rules of construction that support plaintiffs be identified and adopted.
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